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ABSTRACT
The operation of the municipal bond market is reviewed for the
purpose of explaining in what way and to what extent the provisions
of the tax limit law will affect this market. A stepwise multiple
discriminant analysis program was run on a sample of 143 cities and
towns to disclose the statistically significant determinants of
bond ratings prior to enactment of Proposition 2-1/2. Building
upon this analysis, the prospects for future municipal borrowing under
the new revenue constraints were examined.
The statistical analysis indicated that communities with a
high-yield tax base (low tax rate with high tax per capita) tended
to have better ratings. A high proportion of total revenue derived
from the property tax was also associated with higher bond ratings.
Evidence from the data along with interviews with specialists in the
field of municipal bond financing led to the conclusion that the
tax limit law will create severe borrowing difficulties for the larger
cities facing repeated tax reductions over several years. Many
smaller well-off communities will be minimally affected in approaching
the bond market.
The conclusion appraised the options available to mitigate the
negative bond market impacts. State legislative remedies are reviewed,
as are local initiatives in fiscal management. Alternatives to the
general obligation bond as a finance instrument are considered, but
are of limited value in overcoming the current limitations to bond
market access by Massachusetts cities and towns.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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5CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to assess the likely impacts of
Proposition 2-1/2 on the municipal bond market in Massachusetts, and
to identify policies and options at the state and local level that can
by invoked to minimize the negative impacts. The views of a variety
of actors and interest groups have been solicited in order to identify
the full breadth of opinion on the subject. My intention is not so
much to make specific recommendations as to explore and explain the
ramifications of Proposition 2-1/2 and related events on the bond
market. Where legislative remedies are discussed, the focus is kept
rather narrowly on the bond market, although some legislative proposals
impinge upon other concerns as well.
Chapter 580 of the Acts of 1980, popularly known as Proposition
2-1/2, is a statutory proposal that was enacted in Massachusetts on
November 4, 1980. This initiative bill is a multi-faceted law that
limits local revenues by imposing a 2-1/2% limit on property taxes
and by reducing the auto excise tax from 6.6% to 2.5%. Proposition
2-1/2 was sponsored by the tax-cut advocate group, Citizens for
Limited Taxation, with support from business associations including
the High Technology Council and Associated Industries of Massachusetts.
The bill has numerous provisions in addition to the local tax limits,
including a state tax deduction for renters, restrictions on state
mandates to local governments, and abolition of school fiscal autonomy
and of binding arbitration for police and fire personnel. A detailed
description of the act is included in Chapter VI. The most important
6aspects of the law for this thesis is the strict 2-1/2% property tax
levy limit, from which no portion of the local budget is exempted.
Proposition 2-1/2 appears to have already had some impact on
city and town access to the municipal bond market. While it is safe
to say that no community has entirely escaped impact, there are signi-
ficant differentials in the scope and intensity of the impacts experi-
enced by cities and towns. One impact that will affect every munici-
pality is the strict 2-1/2 percent property tax limit, that seems likely
to reduce investor confidence in local capacity to repay long-term debts.
This switch in the security status of new and existing debt is expected
to reduce investor preference for Massachusetts local government's
debt instruments. Investors prefer securities that have low risk of
payment default, and which can be readily liquidated in the secondary
trading market if so desired.
Some cities and towns, furthermore, are facing more severe fiscal
conditions relative to other communities- a fact that was dramatically
demonstrated on March 29, 1981, when Moody's Investors Service sus-
pended ratings on 37 selected cities and towns as well as 7 school
and sewer districts. It is widely assumed that when ratings are
reinstated by Moody's, a number of municipalities will be downgraded
in rating.
This thesis describes the municipal bond market in some detail
to aid in understanding how and why Proposition 2-1/2 will affect the
bond market. This tax limit legislation comes at a time when the
money market nationwide is in a state of turmoil, with unprecedented
7high interest rates for municipal borrowing. Part I. presents an
overview of the national market conditionsas a contextual backdrop
for analysis of the problems now faced by communities in the Common-
wealth.
The tax exempt bond market is a complex and dynamic stage on
which these events will unfold. The interactions between the municipal
borrowers (i.e. the supply sector of the municipal bond market) and
the demand sector (underwriters and investors) have evolved over time
with major trends periodically altering the dominant actors and modi-
fying their respective roles. The tax exempt bond market attracts
tax shelter-seeking investors- primarily commercial banks, institutional
investors, and individuals. Each of these demand segments has responded
to changes in the economic and regulatory environment over the years,
moving into or out of the municipal market as conditions warrant. On
the supply side, the state and local government debt has grown steadily
in volume over the past decade, (from $144.4 billion in 1970 to $312.7
billion in 1979*),whilethe composition of debt issues- the types of
bonds and the purposes to which the funds raised are put- has changed
dramatically in recent years. Part I reviews these national trends
and introduces some of the controversial issues of regulatory reform
that have confronted legislators in recent years.
Part II looks at the linkages between Proposition 2-1/2 and the
municipal bond market by examining the situation from the perspective
of bond market actors. I consider the investor, who will determine
*
See Table 3 in Chapter IV, below.
8at what price he will be willing to enter the market for Massachusetts
bonds in the future. Holders of existing local debt find themselves
suddenly in the position of holding bonds that have a less secure
backing than they did at the time of purchase. Because there has been
very little secondary market demand for Massachusetts certificates
following the passage of Proposition 2-1/2, these holders must retain
their notes for a longer term, perhaps until maturity, to avoid incurring
a loss. The lack of demand in the secondary market potentially destroys
the high liquidity of affected investments, and the expectation of
liquidity is an important criteria for choosing investments. This
situation has already resulted in what one spokesperson for E.F. Hutton
& Co., Inc. has termed a "credibility gap" created for Massachusetts
by enactment of Proposition 2-1/2. This term is used because the
terms of sale for existing debt specified that the debt was secured
by an unlimited taxing power for the life of the bond. With passage
of Proposition 2-1/2, the state had, in effect, reneged on these
contracts, which raises some interesting legal questions that will
be discussed.
My focus then shifts to the cities and towns in Massachusetts.
Much is heard about the terrible consequences of Proposition 2-1/2 on
municipalities, and often these cries are met with charges that local
officials are playing a game of brinksmanship. The fiscal hardships
induced by Proposition 2-1/2 are real, and they will be exacerbated
by the dramatic reductions in federal assistance that are forthcoming.
These institutional changes, furthermore, overlie a national economy
that has been chronically unsettled since the Vietnam War days, with
9persistently high levels of inflation and unemployment. A look at the
fiscal conditions of Massachusetts municipalities prior to passage
of Proposition 2-1/2 will provide a clearer perspective from which to
evaluate the bill's impact.
Using readily available data from the census and from state agen-
cies, a statistical description of local fiscal circumstances in 143
of the 351 communities is undertaken. These 143 municipalities, (those
with population of 10,000 or greater in 1970), will be grouped according
to such attributes as size and change in population. Within these
relatively homogenous clusters, indicators of fiscal condition and
vulnerability to the restrictions imposed by Proposition 2-1/2 will
be examined.
It appears that a number of localities have fared well economically
and will continue to do so despite these tax restrictions. Some cities,
however, are beset by difficulties that will be compounded by loss of
revenues, while others have reached a precarious fiscal balance that
could possibly be upset by compliance with Proposition 2-1/2. If any
Massachusetts city or town enters a full-scale fiscal crisis, or even
misses a number of contractual debt service payments, the entire state
might be stigmatized in the eyes of potential investors in the municipal
bond market.
The 37 communities that have suffered ratings suspensions, as well
as other cities that might also be in jeopardy, are uncertain as to what
are the most important determinants of bond ratings. Using the fiscal
data that has been collected, the pre-2-1/2 bond ratings are investi-
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gated by discriminant analysis to uncover the most significant variables.
It is not surprising to find the effective property tax rate and property
tax payments along with the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied,
are the strongest of the variables tested. It is impossible to predict,
however, what bond ratings will be when they are reinstated.
To some extent the bond market impacts have already begun to be
felt. Investors are very sensitive to such negative circumstances as
the suspension of ratings and the credibility gap problems described
above. Market disruptions of any significant magnitude are not soon
forgotten on Wall Street. The degree of market disruption that will
ensue is dependent upon what, if anything, the legislature comes up with
to alter the provisions of Proposition 2-1/2.
In response to the question of what should be done by the legisla-
ture, a theme that has been repeated frequently, especially by members
of the investment community, is that a comprehensive reform, or overhaul
of the state's tax structure is necessary. It is felt that little will
be accomplished by continuing to pursue incremental tax-law changes such
as Proposition 2-1/2 and other recent changes in the system. Despite
this conviction that a comprehensive approach is the only way toward a
"real" solution, most observers are waiting expectantly and impatiently
for "corrective" legislation that will rectify some of the perceived
problems in 2-1/2.
Part III turns to the question of what the state legislature and
and local government officials can do to ensure that capital improve-
ments financing capacity at the local level does not disappear or be-
come prohibitively expensive relative to other states. In this section,
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the federal government is treated as an exogenous force whose actions
are beyond the control of Massachusetts interests. The emphasis at the
state level is on amendments to Proposition 2-1/2 that have- been pro-
posed by the Legislature's Taxation Committee, chaired by Rep. Gerald
Cohen (D-Andover). Some of the amendments that will be considered include:
1) a proposal that would allow a community to reduce its tax levy by 7-1/2
percent per year until the 2-1/2 percent rate is reached, rather than by
15 percent per year; and 2) elimination of the "no-growth" provision of
Proposition 2-1/2 by allowing the tax levy to increase when new develop-
ment is added to the tax base.
The local initiatives include lobbying (at the State House), planning
(for an efficient and convincing capital improvements program), manage-
ment, public relations, and disclosure of fiscal information. Of course,
the most immediate action that localities can take is inaction- postpone-
ment of long-term borrowing until the smoke clears and the cost of capi-
tal declines. (The borrowing costs are so high, as this is written, that
postponement of capital improvements would occur even without 2-1/2.)
Given the creativity demonstrated by local borrowers in recent years
that has expanded the scope and function of municipal borrowing into
many new areas, one might hope that some of the recent innovation in
forms of municipal bond offerings will prove useful to the suffering cities.
A number of financing techniques, some of which would require state
enabling legislation, are examined as possible or partial solutions to
Massachusetts local capital problems. Negotiated private placements of
local bond issues with local banks and institutions will help some com-
12
munities finance capital 4mprovements. Alternatives to the general
obligation bond- including revenue bonds of various types, bond banks,
tax increment financing, and special assessment districts are considered.
But these financing schemes do not seem to overcome the basic constraint
of a limited taxing authority.
Mayor Kevin White has stated that the problems faced by Boston are
fundamentally political rather than economic ones. Clearly Proposition
2-1/2 came about as a result of a political process, and any remedies
involving legislative action must be viewed in this highly politicized
environment.
13
PART I
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
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CHAPTER II. THE FUNCTION OF THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET
A Historical Overview of the Municipal Bond Market in the U.S.
The municipal bond market brings state and local government borrowers,
in need of large scale, long-term capital resources, together with pri-
vate sector investors. State and local governments have incurred long-
term debt to finance capital intensive infrastructure improvements since
before the Civil War.I The traditional purposes to which bonded funds
have been applied include such major long-term investments as transit
systems, water and sewer systems, and school facilities. Long-term
borrowing is necessary for such projects because current revenues are
inadequate to cover the large construction costs, or it would require
too large of a tax increase to fund these projects on a pay-as-you-go
basis. It is also felt that the construction costs of a facility should
be spread over its useful life, so that the future beneficiaries of the
inprovements will also share in the expense of providing them.
To secure long-term financing for capital improvements, the local
government entity endeavors to sell a bond for the amount required.
An important feature of local bonds is the federal tax-exempt status of
income earned from interest payments by state and local governments to
the investors.
The concept of "reciprocal immunity" 2 holds that= as states arei unable
to tax federal activities, then neither shall the federal government have
1Moak, Lennox L., Administration of Local Government Debt,Municipal
Finance Officers Association, Chicago, 1970, p. 9.
2Rabinowitz, Alan, Municipal Bond Finance and Administration, Wiley-Inter
science, New York, 1969, p.118.
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power to tax state or local government activities. This tax-exempt status
of municipal bonds has created a specialized demand for such securities,
by investors who face high marginal federal tax rates. Thus municipal
borrowers have a ready, although somewhat limited, market for their bonds.
The pre-tax yield (i.e. interest rate) on municipal bonds is generally
several percentage points lower than that of comparable taxable securities.
This differential translates to the reduced cost of capital for state
and local borrowers relative to the private sector. The term "municipal
bond market" encompasses transactions involving many forms of tax exempt
securities, issued by state, local, county or other governments and local
public authorities.
The volume of borrowing by state and local governments has grown
immensely over the last 150 years or so. Boston exemplifies the national
trend, starting with a bonded debt level of just $100,000 in 1822, which
grew to more than $1,500,000 by 1840.3 By June, 1980, Boston's total
net debt outstanding was $542.3 million.4 The volume of state and local
debt has grown at a comparable rate nationwide over this period, but
this growth trend was interrupted by economic depressions that occurred
in 1837, 1873, 1893, and 1929.5
The early period of heavy local borrowing, before the 1873 crash,
was part of a flurry of construction and reconstruction activities re-
lated to the Civil War. There was a fervor to those improvement plans
30p. Cit., Moak, p. 9.
4Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Dept. of Revenue, Bureau of Accounts, 1980.
5Hempel, George H., The Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt, National
Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1971, p. 6.
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that was fueled in part by competition between state and local govern-
ments for economic development. It was assumed that once the rail links
or other improvements were in place, economic development would follow.
With the 1873 depression came widespread default on these rather specu-
lative project bonds.
In the aftermath of the 1873 depression, local borrowing was much
more carefully controlled by regulations enacted by most states. None-
theless, a surge of local borrowing preceded the Great Depression, and
again, the fallen economy drove a number of municipal borrowers into
arrears on payments of principal and interest. Default in the municipal
bond market occurs as a continuous yet very small percent of the amount
of debt outstanding. Major episodes of serious and widespread default,
however, have been coterminous with historically significant economic
downturns. The level.of activity and the default risk in the municipal
bond market both appear to be pro-cyclical. Borrowing levels increase
with the boom period that frequently precedes a downturn. The "roaring
twenties" were characterized by economic growth, much of which was
fueled by speculative investments in anticipation of further growth.
Just as the stock market action was built upon a paper shell of credit
not backed by solid security, so was much local investment secured by
the expectation of rising property values. Special Assessment bonds
secured by a surcharge on the taxes of benefited properties were used
to finance subdivision improvements. The bond issues for these improve-
ment plans were predicated on the assumption that residential growth
and private investment would follow the capital improvements. The debt
17
service payments were to be derived from the flow of revenue generated
by the projected increase in the property tax.base.
This mode of financing improvements can be a responsible financing
strategy on the part of local governments, depending upon how speculative
are the growth projections, and what constitutes the security behind
the debt instrument. Every capital improvements program is designed
around a forecast of demand for the service: be it a highway, a water
system, or a school or playground. The security behind a bond issue is
the local revenue source that is pledged toward repayment of the debt
principal and interest.
The term 'general obligation bond" refers to bonds that are secured
by the full faith and credit of local revenue sources- chiefly tax reve-
nues, which are pledged to guarantee the principal and interest payments
to the bond holder. Typically, the general obligation bond is backed
by an unlimited local government taxing power. In recent history, how-
ever, a number of states have enacted strict tax limitation legislation-
most notably Proposition 13 in California in 1978 and recently including
Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts. These laws impose a limit on the
rate of local government property taxation, and on other local revenue
sources. It is therefore necessary to make a distinction between general
obligation bond issues backed by an unlimited taxing power, and a rela-
tively new category of general obligation bonds backed by a limited local
taxing power.
In addition to general obligation bonds, there are bonds that are
secured by the pledge of revenues projected to be generated by the pro-
18
ject itself. These bonds, called "revenue bonds", are frequently used
to finance public utilities such as energy, water, and sewer systems,
to which a user fee can be attached which makes up the revenue stream
that secures the debt.
Whichever type of bond is used, the risk to the bondholder (the
investor who lends the money to the municipality in exchange for the
promise of a schedule of repayments with interest), is that the revenue
source that has been pledged to secure the debt will not materialize
or will be insufficient to meet the debt service payments. If the
repayment of principal and interest does not occur on schedule as agreed
at the time the bond is sold, then the bond is in a state of default.
While bond default of any kind is viewed with great alarm by investors,
there is a broad range of default conditions that have occurred histori-
cally, from delays in payments to repudiation of debt. A "major default
situation" is one that is not a "technical" or temporary default con-
dition, and one that involves the failure to pay principle or interest
on a debt of one million dollars or more.6
Looking back at the default conditions that occurred prior to
World War I, the most serious permanent losses are attributable to the
defaults of 1873-1879, following a period of quite speculative and
uncontrolled local investments. The basic attributes of the pre-World
War II municipal bond market are best summarized by a table in George
6Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, City Financial
Emergencies: The Intergovernmental Dimension, Washington, D.C., 1973, p.16.
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H. Hempel's The Postwar Qualitylof State and Local Debt, which is
reproduced below as Table 1.
TABLE 1
Comparison of the Extent of befaults by State and Local Units in Major Default Periods
(dollar figures in thousawds)
Total Past Due Los&
Ave
and
Ou
rage Sta-a Indebtedness of Per Cent
L.ocal Debt Defaulting State of Debt
tstanding and Local Units Outstanding
$245,000
1,000,000
1,300 ,000
18,500,c00
S 125,000
245,000
130,000
, 850 o,0
51.0
24.5
10.0
15.4
Source: Based on data furom Gorge H. Hemp-::1, "The Postwar
Quality of Municipal Bonds u- ubidshe dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1964, pp. 84-1 1.
aDoes not include interest n : rnaid i s:-
bDoes not include interet-;- id :-anerst, Interest due after
of
Interest Per Cent Principal Per Cent
and of Debt and of Debt
Principala Outstanding Interestb Outstanding
n.a. - S 15,000 6.1
n.a. 150,000 15.0
n.a. - 25,000 1.9
3 2 ,OOc - 1.7 100,000 .5
a debt was repudiated or interest lost due to refunding at a lower
interest cost.
cOverdue interest plus debt upon which interest is in default was
$1,355,000 or 7.3 per cent of debt outstanding ini 1929-37. This
figure is not available for the earlier default periods.
n.a. =not available.
The 100 year period from 1837 to 1937 can be characterized as the
reckless youth of the municipal bond market in the United States. The
rapid growth in state and local debt as well as the turbulence over the
period are evident. Given the severity of the Great Depression, with
its bank closings, it is somewhat surprising that a larger proportion
of state and local indebtedness did not enter into default. The rela-
tively low levels of permanent losses that resulted indicates that the
institution of the municipal bond market was moving toward increased
7Hempel, George H., The Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt, National
Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1971, p. 32.
Period
183743
1S73-79
1893-99
1929-37
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investor security and municipal responsibility. The volume of default,
however, revealed that renewed caution and conservatism were called for
in the recovery that followed World War II.
In the years immediately following the Great Depression, the
municipal bond market was relatively stagnant. Total local government
indebtedness went from $15.7 billion in 1934, to $16.7 billion in 1940,
and was reduced by wartime restrictions on capital investment to $13.6
billion in 1946.8 These restrictions created a condition of pent-up
demand for state and local capital improvements that was unleashed in
the period following the war.
Chart 1 shows the steady growth in state and local debt outstanding
from 1952 to 1978. This figure depicts graphically the composition of
state and local debt according to Bureau of the Census categories.
The lower region shows
local debt segmented into long-term "full-faith and credit" (i.e. general
obligation) and "non-guaranteed" long-term (generally including revenue
bonds and special assessment bonds) plus short-term debt, which is shown
separately after 1967. State debt overlies the local debt and is simi-
larly categorized, except that short term state debt is grouped with
non-guaranteed debt.
In 1955, state and local debt outstanding totalled to $44.5 billion,
of which $33.1 billion, or 74 percent, was local debt. Of the local
debt in that year, 74 percent was backed by the full-faith and credit
of local taxing power. By 1965, state and local debt together had more
80p. Cit., Moak, pp. 11-12.
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than doubled, reaching $99.5 billion, of which the local portion was
$72.5 billion or 73%. The share of local debt that was secured by
full faith and credit had declined to 61 percent in 1965. Data for
1978 show some interesting trends. The total debt had increased to
$280.4 billion with the local share declining to 63%. Of the 177.9
billion in local debt, the full faith and credit share had fallen still
further to 54 percent.9
To summarized the trends, it is evident that while both state and
local borrowing have grown steadily and strongly from 1952 to 1978, the
state debt has grown somewhat faster than has the local debt. There
has been a significant shift in local debt towards revenue bonds and
other "non-guaranteed" issues, as well as some increase in short-term
debt, especially between 1970 and 1978.
9The Bond Buyer, "Statistics on State and Local Government Finance",
Joan Lulkovich, Ed., Vol. 18, 1980, New York, p. 8.
23
CHAPTER III. TRENDS IN THE SUPPLY OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
The Joint Economic Committee Report on Public Facility Financing
explains the emerging local trend toward alternatives to general
obligation bonds as follows:
"The declining relative use of general obligation bonds
may be attributable to (1) the narrow spread in interest costs
between general obligation and revenue bonds; (2) the growth
of public authorities that issue bonds payable solely from
revenues of income-producing properties; (3) constitutional,
statutory, and home rule charter limitations on general
obligation indebtedness (usually expressed as a percentage
of the assessed valuation of taxable property); and (4) the
comparative ease of authorizing revenue bonds (no approval
by the electorate required and no tax increase need be voted
upon). "10
The term "revenue bonds" and the Census Bureau's term "nonguaran-
teed debt" both describe local debt instruments that are not secured
by governmental general revenue sources, but depend instead on some
other revenue stream for debt service payments. Most, but not all, of
these instruments are secured by revenues guaranteed by charges against
the beneficiaries of the improvements, rather than from the general
funds. This chapter identifies the range of mechanisms that have evolved
to produce a variety of debt instruments that fall into the "nonguaran-
teed" or "limited obligation "category.
10The U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economic
Progress, State and Local Public Facility Needs and Financing, Vol. 2,
Public Facility Financing, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C., December 1966, p. 8.
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Special Assessment Bonds
One method for financing improvements that obligates the bene-
ficiaries to meet the debt service requirements is the "special assess-
ment" bond. This financing mechanism applies an extra tax assessment
against property that receives direct benefit from the improvement,
such as assessments against property owners for curbs and gutters in
residential areas. These bonds lost popularity after the defaults
that occurred during the Great Depression. Many of the defaults were
special assessment bonds for subdivision improvements for which the
projected revenue did not materialize.
It has been suggested that one reason special assessments have not
become more prevalent in the United States is that the affected property
owners are unwilling to approve investments that will generate a long-
run benefit but will incur a near-term loss or financial outlay. Donald
C. Shoup has suggested a modification of the special assessment, that
would allow property owners to defer payment for improvements (subject
to an added interest cost) until such time as they sell their house and
thereby capitalize the benefits derived from the improvement. 11 This
"deferred special assessment" scheme may eventually gain a position in
public facility financing, but special assessments of any kind are not
widely used today in the U.S.
Special Tax Bonds
The mechanism of "special tax" bonds uses revenues derived from
Shoup, Donald C., "Financing Public Investment by Deferred Special
Assessment", National Tax Journal, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Tax Institute
of America, Columbus, Ohio, Dec. 1980, pp. 413-429.
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a special tax against some product or service, such as an excise tax,
general sales tax, or a franchise. A few states rely on this mechanism
extensively to finance capital spending. For example, Alabama and
Florida use cigarette taxes to support bond issues. Some cases of
special tax bonds link the revenue source to the type of improvement,
such as gasoline taxes used to secure highway improvement bonds. From
the investor's viewpoint, it is desireable if the revenue source is
used solely to secure bonds, so that no competing demands will jeopardize
the funds needed for debt service payments.
Enterprise Revenue Bonds
The two debt instruments discussed above should not be confused
with "enterprise revenue bonds", which are secured by charges of fees
collected from actual users of the facility. Enterprise revenue bonds
and another system called "lease-rental bonds" make up the lion's share
of so-called nonguaranteed state and local debt. (While enterprise
revenue bonds are here distinguished from these other revenue based
instruments, it is common usage to categorize all of these bond types
together as "revenue bonds".)
The rising importance of revenue bonds of varying design can be
attributed to the desire of municipalities to avoid state-imposed debt
limitation and the other factors mentioned in the above Joint Economic
Committee (JEC) excerpt. Another very important factor has been the
ever expanding view of the courts (and of the Internal Revenue Service)
as to what constitutes a legitimate "public purpose" investment there-
by eligible for tax-exempt status for borrowing purposes. Another
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writer in the JEC volume of public facility financing, Frank Curley,
elaborated on this influence on revenue bond utilization:
"Probably the single most important development in
revenue bond financing in the past two decades has been
the broadened concept of public purpose- the object for
which such bonds may lawfully be issued by a municipal
or public corporation. Prior to 1946, certain municipal
utility services, such as electricity and water, were
recognized in a number of states as legitimate purposes
for municipal revenue bond financing. Toll roads and
bridges, though not yet widely financed by this means,
were generally accepted. With the increasing demand fol-
lowing the war for public services and improvements with-
out a corresponding increase in the tax burden, legisla-
tures have authorized and courts have approved as public
purposes a variety of facilities and undertakings scarcely
contemplated in prewar years. Airports throughout the
country have been constructed or expanded through the
issuance of revenue bonds secured by long-term leases with
participating airlines. Public parks and recreation areas
and facilities have been successfully financed with revenue
bonds, as have stadiums and public sports facilities. Huge
power projects have been erected on the Nation's major rivers
as a result of revenue bond financings, in many cases by
public authorities or corporations. Rapid transit facili-
ties, a world trade center in New York City, and various
other public improvements are being financed through
revenue bonds."12
A trend in enterprise revenue bond financing is the increased
role to entities such as public authorities and special districts.
These authorities resemble private corporations in structure, although
they are creations of the public sector, set up to construct and
operate large-scale public service enterprises. While most such
authorities are subsidized out of local general revenues of one or
more jurisdictions, the managerial independence insulates these cor-
porations from general purpose claims by local governments upon oper-
ating revenues. This insulation increases-the value of such oper-
120p. Cit., Joint Economic Committee, p. 157.
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ating revenues as a security with which to back enterprise revenue bonds.
Examples of such enterprises in Massachusetts include the Metropolitan
Boston Transit Authority (MBTA), Massport, the Metropolitan District
Commission (MCD), the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, and the recent
addition of Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company (MMWEC)-
all of which are interjurisdictional in scope. (Boston has recently
created the Water and Sewer District, a "sub-local" district, the advan-
tages of which will be discussed in a later section.)
Lease-Rental Bonds
One further trend that was recognized as a major contribution to
the tax exempt bond market by the JEC in 1965 is the growth in lease-
rental financing of both public and private enterprises. The lease-rental
arrangement originated in the 1930's when it was conceived as a device
to stimulate economic growth in the then-depressed southern states. Var-
iously called industrial development bonds (IDBs), industrial aid bonds,
or industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), these debt instruments are issued
by local government agencies to purchase or construct industrial parks,
plants, equipment, etc., which are subsequently leased to private enter-
prise. The lease payments are at levels consistent with the debt ser-
vice requirements and thereby make up the security behind the lease-ren-
tal bond issue. Such an arrangement is advantageous to the private
corporation because of the lower tax-exempt finance costs. Further
benefits to the private operator can be designed into the arrangement
by allowing the private partner to establish some equity in the facil-
ity either by contributing capital, or more usually, by having the
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lease payments function as long-term purchase payments. The private
partner is then able to depreciate the plant and equipment for federal
tax purposes, which is not a possibility available to local governments,
since they pay no federal taxes.
The intention and public purposes behind these lease-rental bond
issues is to promote employment and economic development by encouraging
expansion and recruitment of private businesses, usually industry in
the early years. The first such bond, for the amount of $85,000, was
issued in 1936 as part of Mississippi's "balance agriculture with indus-
try" (BAWI) plan. 13
Very little use was made of IDBs until 1951, although several
southern states passed the necessary enabling legislation to facilitate
these issues. Pre-1951 IDB volume amounted to only $5.7 million cumula-
tively. The innovation spread in that year, however, and between 1951
and 1965, 30 states enacted IDB enabling legislation and the volume of
IDB issues grew to $729 million cumulatively by 1965.14 As the use of
these bonds to entice private enterprise became more popular over this
period, increasingly many states felt the pressure to follow suit in
the interstate competition for economic development- if only to retain
their exising economic base. Currently, 46 states, (including Massa-
chusetts in 1967), have enacted legislation to issue IRBs. Recent
high interest rates accompanied by unusually wide spreads between tax-
13Ibid, p. 162.
14 Ibid, p. 163.
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exempt and taxable interest rates have spurred the use of IRBs in 1979
and 1980.15
Growth in IRBs since 1965 has been dramatic. The Congressional
Budget Office conducted a study which estimated the volume of IRBs in
1975 at $1.2 billion, in 1978 at $3.5 billion, and in 1979 at $7 billion.16
The federal government intervened to reduce the volume of IRBs in 1968,
by changing the U.S. tax code to set a $1 million limit per project
funded by an IRB. No limits, however, were placed on projects for
pollution control, sports, transportation facilities, and industrial
parks. 17  According to data reported in the National Journal, this
growth resulted in an increase in the share of tax-exempt bonds accounted
for by IRBs from an insignificant portion in 1970 to almost 15 percent
of the volume of tax-exempt issues in 1979.
The growing value of industrial revenue bonds has fueled the con-
tinuing controversy over what constitutes a legitimate public purpose
for the issuance of tax-exempt bonds. Tax-exempts are fundamentally
a federal subsidy in the form of a tax expenditure- an expense that
takes the form of foregone.tax revenues rather than a direct expenditure
from the U.S. Treasury. The costs of such a federal subsidy are largely
15Congressional Budget Office, "Study of Industrial Development Bonds:
Some Preliminary Findings", Unpublished preliminary summary. Con-
gressional Budget Office, 1980, p. 2.
16Samuelson, Robert J., "Industrial Revenue Bonds- Economic Boon or Pub-
lic Rip-off?", National Journal, October 1980, p. 1750.
17Black, Rebecca R.W., Andrew Reamer, Joseph Soley, and Richard Whitman.
"An Examination of the Industrial Revenue Bond Program in Massachusetts",
Unpublished paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 1980.
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hidden costs- they appear nowhere in the federal budget, yet they repre-
sent a draw on the treasury estimated at $1 billion in fiscal year 1981.18
Other costs associated with IRB's include exemption of these bonds from
state income taxes (in most states) and, in some states, exemption of
IRB-financed facilities from local property and sales taxes. Perhaps
the most important cost of IRBs, and probably the most difficult cost
to calculate, is the inflationary impact on the cost of state and
local borrowing for traditional public purposes, such as roads, schools,
and sewers.
Even if the growth in IRBs is costing state and local governments
more when they issue their own bonds, government officials at these
levels are anxious to retain the unconstrained power to issue IRBs.
Congress is justifiably concerned about the mounting federal expense,
and because IRBs are extensively used for what Ohio Senator Howard
Metzenbaum calls "frivolous uses." Although originally conceived to
generate industrial investment in needy areas, commercial uses for
IRBs abound, including bond issues to finance Wendy's and McDonald's
hamburger outlets, K Mart department stores, and Revco drug stores to
name a few of the most prominent examples.20 The argument over IRBs
continues, and federal legislation might alter the rules of the game in
the future. Until such time, however, the IRBs will continue to
flourish for a variety of private projects. So long as states surrounding
190p. Cit., Samuelson, p. 1749.
20 Dun's Review, "The Controversy Over Industrial Revenue Bonds Heats Up
Again", September 1980, pp. 70-72.
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Massachusetts are actively courting private enterprise by offering
tax-exempt financing, it is assured that Massachusetts will stay in the
IRB game also. Given that IRBs are estimated to comprise 15% of the
tax-exempt bond market, and given that the demand for tax exempts is
limited, then the concern over the rising costs of tax-exempt bonds
induced by IRB issues is justified.
Other forms of lease-rental obligations include Pollution Control
Bonds (PCBs), and authority financing bonds. All lease-rentals are
legally supported under the "executory contracts doctrine." This
doctrine is explained by Wade S. Smith as follows:
"The relevant consideration of the executory doctrine is
that, legally, a lease does not create a long-term debt, because
it is executory in nature. The lessor must make the leased
facility available, fit for its intended use...as the lease con-
tract sets forth... The lessee is required to pay rent as due...
in accordance with the contractual undertaking.. .The contract
is enforceable by either party only to the extent that patty
executes its respective parts of the agreement. As long as
rent is collected annually, the debt thereby created does not
extend beyond that year. Hence, bonds secured by a lease do
not create a debt extending beyond one year, constitutional
or statutory restraints on the incurring of indebtedness are
bypasses, and another class of "non-debt" debt exempt from the
usual restraints is created." 21
Lease-rentals are a device by which restraints on both the amount
of local debt and the purpose for which debt is incurred are bypassed.
Pollution Control Bonds have been in existence since 1973. They were
conceived to provide financial assistance and incentive for private
industry to comply with federal environmental legislation enacted be-
tween 1969 and 1972. The actual purpose for which PCBs are used, how-
21Smith, Wade S., The Appraisal of Municipal Credit Risk, Moody's Investors
Service, Inc., New York, 1979, p. 184.
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ever has a resemblance to IRBs, in that they are used to attract indus-
22
try to a region. The actual volume of PCBs is hard to estimate because
many such issues are private placements that do not get reported to
sources like the Bond Buyer. Using Bond Buyer statistics as a base
line, however, it is estimated that PCB volume has grown from $2.1
billion in 1973 to $2.9 billion in 1979, with a peak of $3.9 billion
in 1977.23 According to two econometric studies, one by the Harvard
Institute of Economic Research, and another by the Urban Institute,
the impact of PCBs on total tax-exempt interest rates is estimated to
be between 30 and 85 basis points respectively.24 (One basis point
equals 1/100th of one percent.)
The other form of lease rental bond which is widely used involves
a public corporation to issue debt and construct a facility that is
leased back to the local government. The lease-back payments cover
debt service payments as they do for IRBs. Generally the ownership of
the facility is transferred to the local government when the debt is
retired. Schools, hospitals, and other public facilities have frequently
been financed through lease-rental bonds issued by special authorities.
Because of varied reporting practices for tax-exempt bond issues,
exact data on the types and purposes of bonds are not available.
The Bond Buyer publishes an annual statistical report that encompasses
22Leung, George W., An Analysis of the Municipal Bond Market, Factors
Influencing Municipal Bond Participation; Unpublished Masters of City
Planning Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1976,
p. 41.
230p. Cit., The Bond Buyer, "Statistics...", p. 8.
24Op. Cit. , Leung, pp. 41-42.
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most of the available data. 25 One table compiled by the Bond Buyer,
State and Municipal Bonds Sold by Purposes, appears below as Table 2.
TABLE 2
STATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDS SOLO BY PURPOSES
1970-1979
School.................................
W ater and Sewert...............
Hichway. Bridge and Tunnel
Gas & Electric t..................
Hospital...............................
tate & Mun.
Housing Finance..............
Industrial.............................
Polution Control ..............
ruosc Housing Auth'ority
Ot.er #......... ......... ............
1.000 oamitad)
1979 1978 1977 1916 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971
$4,924,482 $6,239,540 S 5,136,350 S 5,177,240 5 4 455,535 S 4,929.513 SA 6,911 S5.348,943 S5.723.009
3.734,590 4,469,944 4,459,140 3,307.91 2.461.694 2.123,119 2,296 073 2,641.441 3.617.497
935,690 1.876,918 1.350,479 1,552.,5 .065.391 983.813 1.453.415 2,082,257 2.717,903
4.714,457 5,991,730 5.750,819 4,457.356 2.181.455 1,521,757 1,558,337 ..-.-
3,517,429 3,138,494 4,734.054 2,725,975 1.959..19 1,292.4.9 -.
12.04 1,2 44 ........ ........ ...... . ........ ... - - - .-
1.339,890 586,076 463.316 356.909 517 801 339.970 259.762 470,695 21 .510
2,891,735 3,482,361 3,868,146 2,664.355 2.525,046 2,179.005 2.093.512
.. . .. 460.985 1.029.20 958.93 1 003.435
8,161,297 20,429.696 19,297 663 13,603.024 14,129.275 8.999,394 9,44.345 - 11,238,535 11.091.139
TOTAL.............$ 42,260,817 $46,214,763 $45,060,459 $33,844,556 629 325.2?9
Figure revised for the year 1975.4
Figures revised for the years 1973-75.#
Includes industrial and non-industrial financing..
(Statistics compiled by "The Daily Bond Buyer.")
1970
S4.983,101
2,329.706
1,497,392
47.593
130.790
8,773.061
S22.823,953 S22.952.646 S22,940,843 S24,369,536 $17,761.645
An example of. the problems with this data can be illustrated by
noting that the volume of industrial bonds as reported in the Bond
Buyer table is much less than the amount reported by the Congressional
Budget Office, cited earlier. This difference is explained by the
large amount of IRBs financed through private negotiations with local
banks and other fund sources. These transactions are not recorded by
the Bond Buyer, which compiles data only for issues open to competitive
bids. Recognizing that these data are downward biased for issues that
are frequently negotiated rather than sold through competitive bids,
250p. Cit., The Bond Buyer, "Statistics...", p. 8.
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Table 2 nonetheless provides a summary of the trends in the purposes
for which tax exempt bonds are issued.
This chapter has described most of the forms that a municipal bond
is likely to take. Two other types that deserve mention are the moral
obligation bond and the tax allocation bond. A moral obligation implies
that the general revenues of a governmental unit will support the bond
issue if such support becomes necessary, but there is no legally binding
mechanism to guarantee the support. In New York, for example, the state
provided a moral obligation pledge to reinforce the security behind New
York State's Urban Development Corporation. The New York fiscal crisis
of 1975 shook what little confidence investors might have had in moral
obligations, however.
Tax allocation bonds were popular in California prior to the advent
of Proposition 13. These issues are used to finance public improvements
on specific sites, at which subsequent private development will occur.
Any increase in property tax revenue resulting from the ensuing site
improvements is pledged toward debt service. Proposition 13 in Cali-
fornia dealt these issues a severe blow by limiting the rate of growth
in assessments. This type of debt, also called tax increment financing,
has been used sporadically in other states, and will be discussed again
briefly in Part III.
The next chapter focuses on the demand sector- those investors who sup-
port municipal capital expenditures.
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CHAPTER IV. THE DEMAND SECTOR- TRENDS IN HOLDERS OF DEBT
To understand the functioning of the municipal bond market and
respond appropriately as borrowers, local governments need to consider
the composition of the market for tax-exempt issues. Investors in the
municipal market are attracted to the tax-free interest on bonds, and
the relative security of local government debt instruments. Investors
facing a high marginal tax rate are able to realize higher after tax
yields from municipal bonds than from taxable securities that have a
higher before tax interest rate. For example, an investor facing a 50%
marginal tax bracket should be indifferent between a tax-free investment
with a 6% yield and a taxable investment with a 12% yield, (assuming
comparable quality with regard to risk and payment schedule.) Any in-
crease over 6% on the municipal bond would tilt the investor's prefer-
ence to the tax-exempt security.
The major investors in the municipal bond market are those with
surplus funds who seek a tax-sheltered investment. The most important
such investors historically have included commercial banks, fire and
casualty insurance companies, and individual investors (i.e. households.)
Table 3 shows the dollar amounts and percent distributions of the holdings
of these and other investor groups, from 1946 to 1979, for selected
years. While the three major investors stand out clearly and consis-
tently as holders of state and local government debt, one can discern
changing patterns and trade-offs between the households, commercial
banks, and insurance companies.
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TABLE 3
HOLDERS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
Year...............
Total Debt
Outstanding........
Households.........
Mon-Financial
Corporate Business.
State and Local
Governments........
Commercial
Banks..............
Savings and Loan
Associations.......
Mutual Savings
Banks..............
Life Insurance
Companies..........
Other Insurance
Companies..........
Brokers and
Dealers............
Year...............
Households.........
Non-Financial
Corporate Business.
State and Local
Governments.........
Commercial
Banks..............
Savings and Loans
Associations.......
Mutual Savings
Banks..............
Life Insurance
Companies..........
Other Insurance
Companies..........
Brokers and
Dealers............
1946
15.6
7.2
.3
2.4
4.4
.1
.6
.2
.3
1946
46.2
2.1
15.4
28.2
.6
3.8
1.3
1950
24.7
9.6
.5
3.6
8.1
.1
1.2
1.1
.4
1950
38.9
2.0
14.6
32.8
.4
4.9
4.5
(Selected Years, 1946 to 1979)
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
960 1965 1970 1975
8.7 100.0 144.4 223.8
8.7 37.2 46.0 68.1
2.4 3.6 2.2 4.5
7.2 5.0 4.4 6.9
7.6 38.5 70.2 102.9
- - .1 1.5
.7 .3 .2 1.5
3.6 3.5 3.3 4.5
8.1 11.4 17.0 33.3
.4 .5 .9 .6
OF TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING
960 1965 1970 1975
1.8 37.2 31.9 30.4
3.5 3.6 1.5 2.0
0.5 5.0 3.0 3.1
5.6 38.5 48.6 46.0
- - .1 .7
1.0 .3 .1 .7
5.2 3.5 2.3 2.0
1.8 11.4 11.8 14.9
1955 1
44.8 6
18.6 2
1.2
5.1
12.7 1
.6
2.0
4.2
.3
PERCENT
1955 1
41.5 4
2.7
11.4 1
28.3 2
1.3
4.5
9.4 1
1.9 1.6 .7 .6 .5 .6 .3 .4 .4 .3 .3
Sources: 1946-65, Joint Economic Committee, Public Facility Financing, Dec. 1976, Table C3, p.40.
1970-79, Bond Buyers 1979 Municipal Finance Statistics, Vol. 18, 1980, p. 44.
(Origin is Federal Reserve Board Flow of funds accounts data.)
1976
239.5
70.6
3.4
11.1
106.0
1.2
2.4
5.6
38.7
.9
1976
29.5
1.4
4.6
44.3
.5
1.0
2.3
16.2
1977
263.2
73.2
3.5
11.2
115.2
1.2
2.8
6.1
49.4
1.1
1977
27.8
1.3
4.3
43.8
.5
1.1
2.3
18.8
1978
291.4
75.0
3.7
12.3
126.2
1.3
3.3
6.4
62.5
.9
1978
25.7
1.3
4.2
43.4
.4
1.1
2.2
21.4
1979
312.7
74.3
4.0
12.2
135.9
1.2
3.2
6.4
74.7
1.0
1979
23.8
1.3
3.9
43.5
.4
1.0
2.0
23.9
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In 1946 the households were the predominant holders with 46.2% of
the outstanding debt, but their holdings of municipal bonds did not grow
as fast as those of commercial banks or "non-life" insurance companies
(fire and casualty). The relative shares held by households and com-
mercial banks reversed between 1946 and 1979, with households decreasing
to 24% while the commercial bank share grew to about 44%. Fire and
Casualty insurance companies were hardly significant in 1946, but by
1979 this sector exceeded the households' share of securities, with
almost 24% of the market. State and local government holdings (which
include general funds and retirement funds) have reduced their share
from 15% to 4% of the market. The brief increase in state and local
holdings in 1976 can be attributed largely to New York government pen-
sion funds' purchase of government securities to help in the bail-out
of New York City. A brief summary of the economic motivations behind
each of these major holders of municipal debt will illuminate these
significant trends in the composition of demand for tax-exempt securities. 2 6
Commercial Banks
The commercial banks have emerged as the most dominant holder of
municipal securities, with almost 50% of outstanding debt. While the
major function of commercial banks is to provide loan funds to private
sector businesses and individuals, municipal bonds constitute a secure
and highly liquid investment alternative when loan demand is weak or
whenever there are surplus revenues to be managed. The tax exempt sta-
tus of municipals is a key factor in- attracring commercial bank funds.
2 6 Much of the following is derived from Op.Cit. Leung, pp. 83-98.
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Municipal bond holdings of commercial banks fluctuate according to
loan demand faced by the banks and according to the revenues received by
the banks. Immediately following World War II, the banks possessed a large
amount of liquid assets with which they purchased municipal securities.
In the mid-1950's, however, consumer and business loan demand increased
due to the strong growth in the economy at that time. Commercial banks
reduced their purchases of municipal bonds in order to free up funds for
loans.
New funds became available to commmercial banks in 1961 when they
gained the authority to sell certificates of deposit (CDs). Using CD
revenue for meeting loan demand, banks were able to invest larger sums
in long-term municipal bonds. Reinforcing this movement of commercial
banks into municipal bonds was a change that permitted the banks to
deduct from their federal taxes the interest costs of borrowing to acquire
tax-exempt obligations. These factors can be observed in Table 3 as the
increasing percent of municipal debt held by commercial banks from 1965
through 1975.
Hidden within the 5-year spans reported in Table 3, is considerable
year-to-year variation in commercial bank activity with regard to the
municipal bond market. Commercial banks tap into their portfolio of
municipals to meet loan demand, even if such action results in capital
losses on their tax-exempt portfolios.27 In effect, the commercial
banks use their tax-exempt holdings as a cushion to absorb the impacts
27
'Op.Cit., Rabinowitz, p.71.
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of changing forces in the banking industry.
One such source of variability to the money markets is Federal Re-
serve action to control the money supply. Federal Reserve credit policy in
1966 was' classified as "active restraint to restraint". As a result
of the tightened money market conditions in the summer of 1966, commercial
banks shifted investments from their tax-exempt portfolios to take
advantage of the increased and highly profitable loan investment oppor-
tunities. Not only did banks reduce acquisition of new municipals in
1966, but some banks "dumped large amounts of municipals in the secondary
market in order to satisfy business loan demand."2 9
Such action by the banks frustrates the restrictive efforts of the
Federal Reserve Board in controlling the money supply. Another effect
is to severely disrupt the tax-exempt market by driving up yields o n
municipals and forcing marginal municipal borrowers to back out of the
credit market as the cost of credit escalates. The burden of federal
restrictive policy is thereby shifted to local governments as well as
businesses. In the fall of 1966, the Federal Reserve responded to this
crisis in the municipal bond market by issuing a letter instructing mem-
ber banks to use municipal bond holdings to secure loans from the dis-
count windows instead of contributing to the disorder of the municipal
market by dumping securities.30
When the commercial banks returned to the municipals market in the
2 8Op. Cit., The Bond Buyer, "Statistics...", p. 21.
2 9Op. Cit., Rabinowitz, p.70, The author quotes William F. Staats, a
Federal Reserve Economist.
30Ibid, p.71.
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1970s, there was a shift toward short-term notes, including Tax Antici-
pation Notes (TANs) and Bond Anticipation Notes (BANs). Bad commercial
loans and uncertainty created by the New York City problems combined to
reduce commercial bank holdings of municipal bonds. Furthermore, parti-
cipation by larger banks in bank holding companies has provided tax shel-
ters and reduced their demand for tax-exempt securities. In the early
1970s, therefore, the role of the smaller commercial banks (those with
less than $100 million of deposits) increased relative to that of the
larger banks.
Fire and Casualty Insurance Companies
The fire and casualty insurance companies (F&Cs) are the major
institutional investors in municipal bonds. F&C participation has grown
steadily from only 1.3% of holdings in 1946 to 23.9% in 1979, about equal
to the holdings of households. The F&Cs are more concerned with high
return on their investment, and are somewhat less concerned with liquid-
ity, than are commercial banks. F&C holdings, therefore, are more
directed toward longer term and lower rated bonds, such as revenue bonds.
The involvement of F&Cs in the tax-exempt market diminishes during periods
of high inflation and high pay-out of insurance policy premiums.. During
such times of reduced profits, the importance of tax-exemption is reduced,
and higher yield taxable securities are substituted for municipals. These
institutional investors are also likely to negotiate investments in munici-
pal projects, because yields are generally higher for negotiated rather
than competitive-bid investments.
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Households
The household sector, a residual category, is really a catchall for
individuals, personal trusts, and other investors not otherwise delineated,
according to Federal Reserve flow of funds data. (Because it is a resi-
dual category, the data is less precise than in the other investor cate-
gories.) The household sector is a significant force in the tax-exempt
market with 23.8% of holdings in 1979. This figure represents a declining
importance since 1946, however, when the household sector accounted for
46.2% of holdings. This sector includes wealthy individuals seeking tax
sheltered investments of low risk, personal trusts managed by professional
advisors on bank trust departments, and municipal bond funds. The bond
funds are mutual investment funds in which less wealthy individuals pool
their funds to purchase a portfolio of tax-exempt investments.
Starting in 1961, these funds have grown quickly in number and in
the volume of tax-exempt purchases. Municipal bond funds accounted for
the greatest percentage increase in household participation and were
expected to "increase to become the market's major purchaser"31 when
data from 1976 were examined. Characteristically, these funds seek
high quality, long-term, revenue obligations, with an A rating or
higher.
While recent data on municipal bond funds are scarce, there has
been a shift away from funds as described above. According to Dave
Maynard (Vice President, Public Funds Management, Fidelity Group),
310p. Cit., Leung, p. 93.
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"the long-term (municipal bond) funds were decimated" in 1978 and-1979.
Predictions made in the mid-1970s, while cognizant of the 1974-75 jump
in tax-exempt yields, did not anticipate the unprecedented high yields
that have occurred in 1980 and 1981. Since the bond funds offer complete
liquidity to investors, when the-yields increased in 1978 and 1979,
investors naturally withdrew from the lagging mutual fund in favor of
better returns available elsewhere in the market.
, Since January of 1980, however, municipal bond funds have returned
with short-term, tax-exempt money market funds. These short-term funds
are better able to track the rising yields because of the quick turnover
in securities. Thus the bond funds have shifted their demand, and
presumably much of the household sector investment, into BANs and TANs
much as the commercial banks have done.
While not exhaustive, the above description of demand and supply
components of the national municipal bond market provides a context for
examining the current situation in Massachusetts under Proposition 2-1/2.
Before turning to Massachusetts, however, it is useful to look at trends
in tax-exempt yields, in comparison with historical trends. The yields
are the result of market interaction between the supply and demand sectors
(municipal borrowers and investors). The market also responds to such
external forces as federal government monetary policy and inflation.
These factors are the subject of Chapter V.
43
CHAPTER V., RECENT TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL BOND YIELDS
One way to examine the cost of municipal borrowing for capital
improvements is to chart the trend of municipal bond yields over time.
The "Trend of the Bond Market" chart (Chart 2) shows the Bond Buyer
Index of 20 municipals* (in bold black line) from 1959 to 1979, along
with the after tax yields on long-term federal securities and corporate
bonds. This chart shows price trends for the bonds as reflected in
average yield for the 20 component municipals. Since falling prices
are reflected by increased yields, a rise in yields is seen as a dip
on the graph. While a lower price paid for a municipal bond increases
the yield to the investor, the borrower experiences increased cost for
capital.
Chart 2 shows that bond prices have been erratic during the latter
part of this 20 year period. Bond prices fell 1969 to 1970, and fell
again between 1974 and 1976, resulting in historically unprecedented
yield , swings, peaking at 7.12% in 1970, and at 7.67% in 1975. In 1979
a third price trough is evident, with a high yield of 7.38%.32 The
municipal yield index shows greater volatility than either the corpor-
ate or the federal indices.
*
The Bond Buyer 20 Bond Index is the average yield of 20 bonds of 20
year maturity with varying ratings. The average rating of the 20
bonds used in this index falls midway between the top four Moody's
ratings.
3 2 Op.Cit., The Bond Buyer, "Statistics...", p. 2 4 .
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One reason for this difference between the volatility of taxable
versus tax-exempt securities has to do with the tax treatment of capi-
tal gains. While interest earned on municipal bonds is exempt from
federal income taxes, this exemption is valid only for the "interest
at issue." If a municipal bond is purchased at discount in the second-
ary market (i.e. purchased at a lower price, thereby producing a higher
yield than the contract yield at the time of issuance), then the ulti-
mate income produced over and above the interest at issue amount is tax-
able at capital gains rates. If the same thing occurs with a taxable
security, the capital gains portion of the ultimate income is taxed at a
lower rate than the interest at issue, because a capital gain is taxed
at 50% of its value. This distinction in tax treatment helps explain
a portion of the tax-exempt volatility, through the relatively differing
advantages to capital gains as a share of income from tax-exempt versus
taxable securities. There are more fundamental causes of the market
turbulence of the seventies, however, that warrant discussion.
Earlier chapters of this section discussed the trends in supply
and demand components of the municipal bond market. State and local
government borrowing has increased in volume and in scope. Debt limits
have been bypassed through lease-rental debt issues, and the constraints
on legitimate public purpose for tax-exempt status have been largely
removed. Pollution control bonds, hospitals and health center bonds,
housing and mortgage insurance bonds, industrial revenue bonds, and
other relatively new uses of tax-exempts have deluged the tax-exempt
market, in conjunction with traditional infrastructure uses of municipal
bonds. The demand sector has grown and kept pace with the overall
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economy, with some shifting of roles among investor groups; there has
been, however, no corresponding growth in demand for tax exempts to
accommodate the supply volume generated by these new uses. Indeed, there
has been some shrinking of the demand sector as large commercial banks
have discovered lucrative new tax-shelter mechanisms.
Structural changes occurred within the municipal bond market, but
the growing market continued to function smoothly until 1970, when a
credit crunch condition caused a significant dip in tax-exempt sales. 3 3
Sales recovered by 1971, as is reflected in the price increases in Chart
2, until 1974, which was the start of a downturn in the United States.
Forbes and Petersen, (in the Twentieth Century Fund's Building a Broader
Market) explain how the recession of 1974-1975 created the severe dip
in municipal bond prices seen in Chart 2, as follows:
"The summer of 1975 brought the curtain down dramatically
on a remarkable era of growth, change, and innovation in the
municipal bond market...The steady upward surge (in the volume
of state and local borrowing) was slowed by periodic credit
crunches of 1966 and 1969, when a scarcity of capital and high
interest rates particularly affected the market for municipal
securities. But tax-exempt sales recovered and made up for
lost ground. Then, in 1975, recession compounded the problems
of inflation. In 1974-75, interest rates on municipal long-
term bonds and short-term notes matched or exceeded the record
high levels of 1970.. .As the economic troubles of 1974 deepened,
a number of shaky situations began coming apart- particularly
in the older metropolitan areas that had long been in diffi-
culty...The stage was set for debacle- and it happened in New
York... In July (1975), in a last-ditch effort to contain the
New York City credit crisis, the Municipal Assistance Corpora-
tion (MAC) began an attempt to sell $3 billion in bonds in
three months. Only the federal government had ever attempted
such a feat... But the scheme failed, and the municipal bond
market continues to feel the shock waves of that event.n34
33
Twentieth Century Task Force on the Municipal Bond Market, Building
a Broader Market, Background Paper by Ronald W. Forbes and John E.
Petersen, New York, 1976.
3 4Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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The "shock waves" Petersen and Forbes referred to in 1976 are still
reverberating today, in mid-1981. Some of the unhealthy symptoms of
today's municipal bond market include wide disparities in the cost of
capital for different categories of issuers, creating a "tiered" selling
market; other distressed older cities following New York City into de-
fault conditions, with Boston now perilously close to adding its name
to the list; and finally, very little respite from the low prices being
demanded by investors, with record high yields being recorded this year.
Tiering of the market occurs because investors have lost a measure
of the faith in the security of municipal bonds. This confidence was
the product of over 30 years of very few default incidents since the
Great Depression. The New York experience showed investors that neither
the state nor federal government is sure to come to the aid of a city
faced with default conditions. The rate disparity between lower rated
investment grade securities (Baa) and the highest grade (Aaa) has widened.
By 1975 the spread in yields between low and high rated bonds had reached
a full percentage point,35 which was considered unusual before 1970.
The weak investor demand for municipals, coupled with the extra
measure of caution and concern about the fiscal solvency of local govern-
ments, has resulted in segmentation of issuers into four tiers. 3 6
Leung, in his thesis on Factors Influencing Municipal Bond Participation,
3 5Ibid, p. 33.
3Op. Cit., Leung, p. 102.
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has ranked these tiers from the most insulated issuers, least affected
by market disruption, to the most vulnerable issuers who have the most
difficulty finding a market for their debt.
Tier one consists of small, wealthy communities with a strong fis-
cal base. Much of the debt issued by these cities and towns is absorbed
locally by civic-minded business and banking interests. The turbulence
of the national market has little affect on these communities. Tier two
is made up of larger cities with a national reputation for fiscal stability.
These cities have a "name issue preference" advantage when competing in
the national market for investors' attention. These top two tiers are
generally able to market their bonds with little trouble and at relatively
high prices.
The third tier is comprised of smaller communities who have not yet
established their credit-worthiness in the market. These issuers are
unknown by the investors, and often are unskilled at negotiating the
path of credit issuance, perhaps entering the market with no bond rating
from the rating agencies. These communities have trouble marketing their
bonds, especially if they are relatively small issues, and will generally
have to pay high yields. Maine and Vermont have relatively many such
communities, so have therefore established bond banks, which consolidate
many small, unmarketable issues, into a larger package secured by a
reserve fund. This system has improved the position of those tier three
issuers, and will be further discussed in part three in relation to
Massachusetts' problems.
The fourth tier, hardest hit by the volatility in the market, are
"problem borrowers", larger and older cities including New York and
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Boston. Others include Philadelphia, Jersey City, Cleveland, Detr.oit,
and Baltimore. These cities all have a reputation that stigmatizes them
in the bond market. Leung describes their plight as follows:
"These large urban cities and agencies are generally con-
centrated in the Northeast. Faced with older infrastructures
and increasing costs, a negative name issuer preference has
developed. Issuers in this group are able to market their
debt only through negotiated sales or seeking funds from un-
sanctioned sources such as state and local government funds
or by persuading banks and large financial institutions into
buying bonds in the interest of public spiritedness...The
funds secured, however, are not without high costs. Record
yields, some one or two percentage points above the median;
and price discounting to 75% of par have been reported within
this group of borrowers." 37
The Importance of Bond Ratings
It is appropriate to think about the tiered market when considering
how cities and towns in Massachusetts will fare in the bond market. To
some extent this tier system is reflected formally in the market through
bond ratines.
When a community sets out to market a bond issue, it will generally
contact Moody's Investor Service and/or Standard & Poor's (S&P) and
arrange to have an up-to-date rating for the new issue. The agency
charges a fee for this analysis, and requests detailed information on
the fiscal and socio-economic status of the community, on which the
agency bases its judgement as to the security behind the bond issue and
assigns the rating. The rating is an index of the quality and risk
38
attributes of the issue. A description of Moody's ratings follows.
3 7Ibid, p. 103.
3 8 First National Bank of Boston, "Guide to Municipal Bond Ratings",
3rd Edition, Boston, Massachusetts, Appendix 2.
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Standard & Poor's ratings are comparable, and the equivalent rating
symbol for S&P is shown in parentheses.
Aaa (AAA)- These bonds are judged to be the best quality. They
carry the smallest degree of risk and are generally referred to as
"gilt-edge". Interest payments are protected by a large or an excep-
tionally stable margin and principal is secure. Any changes in the
various protective elements are unlikely to impair the strong position
of such issues.
Aa (AA)- These bonds are judged to be high quality by all
standards. Together with the Aaa group, they comprise the "high-grade"
bonds, but Aa bonds appear to have somewhat greater long-term risks
than Aaa bonds.
A (A)- A-rated bonds possess many favorable investment attributes
and are considered upper medium grade obligations. Factors giving
security to principal and interest are considered adequate, but elements
may be present which suggest a susceptibility to impairment sometime in
the future.
Baa (BBB)- Considered as medium grade obligations; i.e. neither
highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest payments and principal
security appear adequate for the present but certain protective elements
may be lacking or may be unreliable over any great length of time.
Such bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics and in fact have
speculative characteristics as well.
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These four grades comprise the "investment grade" security ratings.
Lesser ratings (Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C) are assigned to speculative securities,
and many investors are either legally precluded from investing in such
issues (such as commercial banks) or simply choose not to (households).
Very few issues are rated below Baa, since there is little advantage to
a bond with a speculative rating over an unrated bond; both are con-
sidered risky by investors.
Several studies have looked at the relationship between bond ratings
and borrower interest costs, especially at the spread between interest
costs for low or high rated issues.39 While the spread between Aaa and
Baa rated 20 year bonds has fluctuated between 40 and 105 basis points,
it is apparent that bonds of different quality perform differently over
the interest rate cycle as well. Lower grade bonds experience greater
price volatility and are therefore a greater market risk. An example
of this variation from the 1960's showed than an 83 basis point shift
in the yield of a 20 year Aaa bond corresponded to a 100 point change
in a similar Aa bond, and a 126 basis point shift in a Baa bond. 4 0
Most Recent Yield Data
A more detailed look at bond ratings in Massachusetts cities and
towns, and the determinants of bond ratings, will follow in Part II.
Before turning to the next part dealing with Massachusetts and Proposi-
tion 2-1/2, however, I will conclude this chapter with a look at the
39Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Municipal Bond Credit Ratings,
The Rating Game, Background paper by John E. Petersen, New York,
1974, p. 45. Separate studies by Phelps, Kessel, and Petersen are
cited.
40
Ibid, (citing the Phelps study.)
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Bond Buyer 20 index movements after 1979, through April, 1981. Chart 3
presents data that were culled from recent issues of the Weekly Bond
Buyer. The reader might want to refer back to Chart 2 to recall the
trends through 1979, when the index was shown to be sinking to levels
nearly as low as were experienced in 1975.
Chart 3 picks up where Chart 2 left off, and the graph shows that
prices have fallen in the past 18 months to unprecedented low levels.
Record yields were experienced on April 3, 1980 at 9.44%, falling to
a low yield of 7.11% by May 8, only to rise again as prices plummeted
almost continually reaching new lows on December 18, 1980 at 10.56%
yield, rising briefly, and falling again as the Federal Reserve tightened
up on credit by raising the discount rate in April. The most recent
data as this is written shows that on April 30, 1981, the Bond Buyer
20 Bond Index had an average weekly yield of 10.94%.
Such a yield on tax exempt 20 year instruments, with an average
rating between Aa and A, is a reflection of the very unsettled bond
market. At these prices, the cost of capital to state and local govern-
ments is almost prohibitive. Capital improvements plans are being
shelved and expenditures postponed in the hopes that the market will
stabilize at lower interest rates. Most new issues are currently taking
the form of bond anticipation notes if borrowing cannot- be deferred.
John H. Allan, a columnist for the weekly Bond Buyer, reported that
the late April surge in long-term bond yields took many bankers and
borrowers by surprise. Most analysts had predicted a reduction in short-
term interest rates and a leveling of bond yields this spring. These
expectations of favorable market conditions were based on assumptions
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of a slack economy. As it happened, the economy was quite strong, and
the Federal Reserve Board became concerned about the unhampered increase
in the money supply, and therefore decided to let interest rates increase.
In reevalutating current economic conditions to formulate a new
prognosis for the municipal credit market, Allan cites recent progress
toward bringing the inflation rate down to single digit indexes. Given
the robust economy, however, investors are not confident that the lower
inflation rates can be sustained in the long-term. Reagan's economic
policy, moreover, is described by Allan as follows:
"...the Reagan program is a stimulative package of tax cuts and
increased defense spending combined with a restrictive monetary
policy. If that is not a formula designed to drive interest
rates still higher, it is4jard to think of a set of proposals
that would do it better."
Allan elaborated on the economic forces currently affecting the
credit market by citing five key "realities" that were listed by money
market economists, William N. Griggs and Leonard J. Santow. The first
reality cited is the relatively robust economy thAt does not appear to
be headed into a recession in the near future. The second point is the
probability that inflation will remain high in the near future. Third
is that Reagan will succeed in enacting his stimulative fiscal package,
and fourth is the Federal Reserve Board's policy to restrain growth in
the money supply by slowing the growth in bank reserves.
The fifth reality identified by the money market economists concerns
the scheduled federal government sale of $16 billion in notes, which
41
Weekly Bond Buyer, May 4, 1981, Vol. 223, No. 4594, New York, N.Y.,
"The Credit Markets" by John H. Allan, p. 1, and back page.
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must be absorbed by the market. Adding up these five realities, Allan
arrives at the following conclusion:
"For the moment, there appears to be little chance that borrowing
costs- for the U.S. Treasury, for corporations or for states and
cities- are likely to decline significantly at any time soon."4 2
Chart 3 shows dramatically what the current market condition looks
like for municipal borrowers. It is against this contextual backdrop
that we now turn to focus attention on the plight of Massachusetts cities
and towns that have recently been hit with Proposition 2-1/2. Part II
deals with the interaction between these national conditions, the
circumstances of municipalities in the Commonwealth, and the new rules
dictated by the provisions of Propostion 2-1/2.
4 2 Ibid.
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PART II.
LINKAGES BETWEEN PROPOSITION 2-1/2 AND THE
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET
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CHAPTER VI. PROPOSITION 2-1/2 AND THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET
This chapter introduces the major provisions of Proposition 2-1/2
and identifies three linkages that connect this initiative to the munici-
pal bond market. These linkages include: 1) the "credibility gap"
which has shaken investor confidence in the Commonwealth's commitment
to abide by a pre-existing contractual agreement; 2) the loss of the
ability to issue general obligation bonds secured by the full faith and
credit of an unlimited taxing power; and 3) the potential for severe
transitional fiscal stress which will likely be reflected in bond ratings,
and which might jeopardize debt service payments for existing debt. The
third linkage is the subject of Chapter VII.
Proposition 2-1/2
Proposition 2-1/2 places limits on both state and local revenue-
raising capacity, with most emphasis on the local restrictions. The
cornerstone of this bill is the limitation of the local property taxation
to 2-1/2 percent of full and fair market value. Cities and towns with
higher tax rates must reduce their total tax levy by 15 percent per year
until the 2-1/2 percent target tax rate is realized. No city or town,
whether at or below the 2-1/2 percent tax rate, can increase its total
tax levy by more than 2-1/2 percent per year, regardless of the infla-
tion rate or any subsequent new construction adding to the taxable prop-
erty base.
Because additional property investments cannot be fully tapped as
a source of increased revenues, (above the 2-1/2 percent total levy
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increase limit), Proposition 2-1/2 has been labeled a "no-growth" bill.
Land development proposals that would previously have yielded a fiscal
surplus, (i.e. the increment in tax revenues generated by the project
exceed the increment in service costs incurred), may well lose that fis-
cal advantage because of Proposition 2-1/2. This local disincentive to
accept development is very unpopular in the state, which is currently
trying to encourage economic development through the "make it in Massa-
chusetts" campaign.
Another local revenue source, the auto excise tax, was reduced by
61 percent, from $66 to $25 per thousand dollars valuation. Section
12 of the Act specifies that cost assessments by county, district, or
public authority are limited to no more than four percent increase per
year, and that user fees cannot exceed the costs of providing the goods
or services.
In addition to limiting local revenues, the 2-1/2 initiative includes
provisions designed to help local governments cut costs. These provisions
include repeal of the fiscal autonomy of school committees, and repeal
of compulsory and binding arbitration for public employees. Section
five gives to local governments the authority to revoke any optional
provision of the General Laws that has been accepted, if three years
have elapsed since acceptance of the optional provision.
At the state level, Proposition 2-1/2 forbids future unfunded man-
dates to local governments and forbids expansion of property tax exemptions
mandated by the state unless the state reimburses the locality for such
exemptions. State tax revenues will be reduced because of the provisions
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of the bill that allow renters to deduct-one-half of annual rent fr"Om state
income taxes.
The effects of the provisions of the bill will be felt at different
times by the various levels of government. For example, the loss of
auto excise taxes was the first effect that was felt severely by local
governments. The timing of this loss in revenues, which amounted to
$225 million statewide in fiscal 1981,43 was particularly painful
locally. Since the fiscal year in Massachusetts communities extends
from July through June, the 1981 budgets were set with an estimate of
auto excise tax revenues based on the $66 per thousand rate. With pas-
sage of Proposition 2-1/2 in November, and auto excise taxes (which are
collected in the spring) still outstanding for the fiscal year, the
excise tax reduction to $25 per thousand affected the fiscal 1981 bud-
get. Thus each city and town in the Commonwealth suffered an unantici-
pated revenue shortfall this year.
Proposition 2-1/2 is largely a revolt against high taxes, similar
in many ways to Proposition 13 in California. In California, housing
inflation was extreme; property values and assessments were rising at
a fast pace. Property owners felt that the tax burdens were too severe,
and given the opportunity to vote on a tax-limiting constitutional
amendment, their response was two to one in favor of limiting taxes on
real property.
The problem in Massachusetts concerns residents' perceptions of a
high tax burden. Bill Wheaton has shown that although the 1977 Massa-
chusetts property tax bill per capita of $486 was higher than that of
43Boston Globe, March 7, 1981, p. 1.
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any other state, total local revenue per capita is similar to or lower
44than that in other industrial states. By 1978-79, the per capita
property tax bill was reported to be nea'rly $546,45 second only to Alaska.
Wheaton's data show that although the per capita property tax levy in-
creased from 1977 to 1980, it did not increase as fast as inflation.
theTherefore, property tax levy actually declined in real terms over this
period. The voters, however, were not satisfied with this reduction
and approved, (60 percent to 40 percent) the Proposition 2-1/2 tax
limit initiative in November 1980.
A number of researchers are analyzing why voters supported Proposi-
tion 2-1/2 to the extent that they did. While the motivating forces
are more complex than will be discussed here, a review of recent poli-
tical trends in Massachusetts would suggest that a frustrated desire
for tax relief has been growing for several years. The most salient
feature of Massachusetts' tax structure has been the high reliance on
property tax as a source of local revenue, at 84 percent of all local
revenue compared to the national average of 53 percent.46
Former Governor Michael Dukakis included a pledge to cut taxes in
his campaign- a pledge that he failed to keep. In the campaign for
re-election, his opponent, Edward J. King, continually reminded voters
of Dukakis' broken tax cut promise. King proposed to reduce taxes by
$500 million, and on this platform he was elected governor over Dukakis.
44Wheaton, William C., "Proposition 2-1/2: The Prospects", October 25,1980,
D.U.S.P., MIT, p.2.
45Moody's Bond Survey, March 9, 1981, (U.S. Census Bureau Data).
e.g. Helen F. Ladd and Julie B. Wilson, Harvard; and Karl E. Kim, MIT.
46Ibid.
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King also discovered that a $500 million tax reduction was politically
unfeasible. Instead, he substituted the tax-cap legislation. (Chapter
151 of the Acts of 1979), as his major tax cut proposal.
One of the provisions of the 4 percent tax-cap bill required local
governments to fully appropriate any past accumulated surpluses. Locali-
ties that have complied with this law therefore have no local surplus
with which to cushion the blows from Proposition 2-1/2. Nor was there
any significant state surplus as was the case in California. Further
revenue reductions will emanate from the federal government, not only
because of President Reagan's budget cuts, but also in the delayed
reaction of the Federal Revenue Sharing grants to the local tax reductions
induced by the 1979 tax-cap law. The revenue sharing formula includes
a term for local tax effort. A reduction in local tax effort will result
in a reduction in revenue sharing funds after a two year lag.47 Thus,
revenue sharing funds to Massachusetts cities will be on the decline for the
next several years, even without changes in the federal progam guidelines.
Proposition 2-1/2, combined with the 1979 tax cap, impinges in
several ways upon the creditworthiness of Massachusetts' local govern-
ments. The credibility gap issue and the loss of unlimited local taxing
power are the direct or definitional effects of Proposition 2-1/2.
These changes will create a problem for all localities in Massachusetts,
by altering the "terms of trade" in the municipal bond market. The
4 7Boston Globe, "Crisis" (Special report on cities and towns following
Proposition 2-1/2), May 11, 1981, p. 23.
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following chapter will deal with the fiscal stress that might be created
or aggravated by the revenue cuts; the extent of disruption to fiscal
stability varies according to the local condition.
The Credibility Gap
Proposition 2-1/2 is perhaps the most stringent tax limiting legis-
lation that has been enacted in the United States to date. The language
of the bill is strict and unyielding, exempting no portion of the local
budget from its provisions. Furthermore, the initiative prohibits local
override until fall of 1982, thus ensuring that every Massachusetts city
and town will get a taste of the tax limit medicine that has been pre-
scribed for the state. On the other hand, Proposition 2-1/2 takes the
form of a statutory proposal rather than a constitutional amendment, a
distinction which allows the State Legislature to amend or eliminate
the proposition.
Proposition 13 in California is a constitutional amendment which
is much more difficult to alter than is Proposition 2-1/2. The Cali-
fornia bill is somewhat less restrictive, however, in that taxes can be
increased as necessary to meet the principal and interest payments on
all existing voter-approved debt. The specific exemption reads as
follows:
"The limitation...shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or special
assessments to pay interest and redemption charges on any in-
debtedness approved by the voters prior to the time this section
becomes effective."48
Proposition 13 was passed on the state primary ballot of June 6, 1978,
4 8 Beebe, Jack H., "Proposition 13 and the Cost of California Debt,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 Supplement, June 1979, p. 244.
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and became effective July 1, 1978.
Proposition 2-1/2 has no such exemption for taxes allocated to
debt service for existing local obligations. As has already been men-
tioned, this limit on taxing power is inconsistent with local pledges
of unlimited taxing power to secure debt service payments on existing
long-term debt. To pledge the full faith and credit of a local govern-
ment's unlimited taxing power means that the community has obligated
its general revenue fund toward repayment of the debt. General obliga-
tion bond issues must be approved by the voters who will ultimately have
to pay the debt service through tax payments. Despite their explicit
approval of these debt burdens at the local level, however, the voters
revoked their acceptance of tax supported local debt financing when they
voted for Proposition 2-1/2.
In a single stroke, Proposition 2-1/2 abrogated the pledge behind
every local general obligation bond outstanding in the state; no longer
can localities raise taxes as necessary to meet debt service requirements
on general obligation bonds. From the investors' viewpoint, this breach
of faith has at least two implications. First, the holders of pre-2-1/2
Massachusetts general obligation bonds will have difficulty selling
these bonds in the secondary market. Although secondary market data are
not available to verify or quantify this assertion, it is virtually
certain that the prices obtainable for these securities will be signi-
ficantly lower due to reduced investor demand because of Proposition
2-1/2. The tax limit results in a higher risk of default on payments
for outstanding bonds. This problem exists for new bond issues as well,
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and will be discussed further below.
The second implication of Proposition 2-1/2 concerns the perceptions
of the investor community about the reliability of Massachusetts cities
and towns. Reliability in this context refers to the degree to which the
local governments are consistent, predictable, and trustworthy in rela-
tions with investors and underwriters. Proposition 2-1/2 has compromised
these qualities, thereby reducing investor confidence in the reliability
of all of the communities in the state. Two representatives of the
investor sector who have commented on this aspect of the tax limit law
are Howard Mischel of Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Ruth W. Corson,
of E.F. Hutton and Company, Inc.
Mischel, in a speech before the Massachusetts Collectors and Trea-
surers' Association, emphasized that Proposition 2-1/2 precludes future
issuance of unlimited ad valorem tax debt. In addition, Mischel asserted:
"It also appears that the unlimited tax pledge afforded
general obligation debt issued prior to passage of Proposition
2-1/2 is effected;. this point has not been clarified by the
courts or the legislature. Obviously, this is a subject of
great concern to us and all other credit analysts; implicitly
... a form of pledge made to a bond holder appears to have
been broken." 9
Corson characterized the loss of unlimited taxing power to secure
pre-November 1980 debt as a situation leading to a "credibility gap"
between investors and Massachusetts local bond issuers. She claimed
that all Massachusetts bonds will be tainted because of the voters'
collective disregard for earlier local financial commitments. Corson
49Mischel, Howard, Assistant Vice President, Municipal Bond Research
Department, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Speaking at the May 13, 1981
meeting of the Massachusetts Collectors' and Treasurers' Association.
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also raised the legal issue as to whether this portion of Proposition
2-1/2 is constitutionally correct.
"Of principal concern is the status of debt security, as
Proposition 2-1/2 makes no provision to exclude debt service
on existing debt for the limit. While the U.S. Constitution
prohibits passage of any law which would impair existing
contractual obligations, it appears that a default might be
necessary to institute court proceeding with the process of
litigation a time-consuming and possibly disruptive occur-
rence. It is not clear, in fact, whether a plaintiff would
find redress under the contractual protections of the Federal
Constitution'50
There remains uncertainty about the legal status of pre-existing
general obligation bonds vis-a-vis the limits on local taxing power.
The investor community, however, is disturbed that unilateral action by
the state has impaired the quality and therefore the value of outstanding
general obligation debt. The "taint" on Massachusetts results more from
the principle of the action than from the ultimate legal status which
will eventually be determined by the courts in the event of a default.
The Commonwealth has shown bad faith toward the investor community through
passage of Proposition 2-1/2 as it presently stands.
Given that Proposition 2-1/2 has been enacted, however, the legal
status of pre-existing debt is of significant concern. This concern
prompted Boston Treasurer, Lowell L. Richard, 3rd, to inquire about these
legal ramifications of Proposition 2-1/2. The law firm of Palmer & Dodge
concluded that any application of the tax limit law that inhibits payments
of principal or interest to holders of previously issued bonds would be
unconstitutional. The statute itself is not unconstitutional, according
50Corson, Ruth W., Vice President of E.F. Hutton, specializing in munici-
pal bond research, "Perspective: Tax Reform- Massachusetts Style" re-
port and presentation at the Mass. Municipal Association 6th Annual
Legislative Conference, Boston, MA, March 7, 1981.
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to the firm. They maintain, however, that:
"...any application thereof resulting in the impairment
of the obligations of Massachusetts cities and towns to
the holders of bonds issued prior to November 4, 1980,
including the obligation to raise by taxation without
limit revenues sufficient to pay principal and interest
coming due on such bonds to the extent not paid from other
funds, would be unconstitutional." 51
Palmer & Dodge's opinion regarding the constitutionality of
the initiative law as a whole has since been affirmed by the Suffolk
Superior Court (April 1, 1981),52 and later reconsidered by the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court (May 5, 1981)53 While there may be flaws
in the wording or problems in some provisions of the act, (e.g. one
controversy centered around the vagueness and brevity of the summary
statement of the initiative petition), such defects are weighed against
the overall substantive provisions of the law, which are constitutional.
One might wonder whether those who drafted the tax limit initiative
actually intended for the credibility gap to occur. In California, for
example, Howard Jarvis, (co-author of Proposition 13), indicated that he
hoped that redevelopment authorities that had issued non-voter-approved
debt would win a court suit overturning that portion of the tax limit
amendment which jeopardized their capacity to service their debt. Jarvis
admitted that he "never even gave a thought to" protecting those issuers
and holders of debt when he drafted the initiative.54
Similarly, in Massachusetts, there have been indications that Citi-
52Harvey, Joseph M., "Proposition 2-1/2 Wins Major Court Test", Boston
Globe, April 2, 1981, pp. 1, 20.
53Harvey, Joseph M., "SJC Studies Question of Prop. 2-1/2 Legality,"
Boston Globe, May 5, 1981, p. 32.
540p. Cit., Jack H. Beebe, p. 244.
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zens for Limited Taxation, the sponsors of Proposition 2-1/2, are feeling
some regret over the likely consequences of the initiative's so-called
"no-growth" provision.54a The full impact on development projects of
that provision (explained earlier) may not have been anticipated by
the sponsors and voters for the bill. It is unlikely,however, that the
lack of an exclusion providing for tax increases to service pre-existing
debt was the result of unsophisticated drafting of Proposition 2-1/2.
Proposition 13, the national model for tax limit referenda, had such an
exclusion. It seems likely that the 2-1/2 initiative was drafted pur-
posefully as an uncompromising tax relief measure. Any "exclusions,
add-ons, or avoidances" have been left for the state legislature to dole
out, if it dares. Some of the corrective measures under consideration
by the legislature will be discussed in Part III, along with the
political issues that are involved.
Bonds Secured by a Limited Taxing Power
At this writing, there has been only one local government long-term
general obligation bond issue in Massachusetts since passage of Proposi-
tion 2-1/2. On March 18, 1981, Concord received five bids on its $1.56
million, 9-year bond offering, which was bought by two Boston brokerage
houses who together submitted a winning bid of 7.3 percent interest for
the bonds. 55
Most observers of the Massachusetts municipal bond market paid close
54aFitzgerald, Joan, "Some 2-1/2 Backers Thinking it all over," Boston
Globe, February 23, 1981. pp. 21, 24.
55 Lowery, Donald, "Concord Issue Sells at 7.3%," The Boston Globe,
March 19, 1981.
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attention to the Concord bond sale as a barometer of the changes in the
municipal bond market brought on by Proposition 2-1/2. A number of
features, however, combined to make the Concord issue very attractive
to investors, despite the limited taxing power pledged as debt security.
First, Concord is not severely affected by Proposition 2-1/2, needing
to make only a few budget cuts that will not severely affect service
levels. 56  Moody's rated the issue as Aa, which is the same rating as
was assigned to Concord's most recent pre-Proposition 2-1/2 bond issue. 57
The timing of the Concord issue appears to have been very strategic
in securing the financing at this very reasonable interest rate. Concord
Treasurer, Anthony T. Logalbo, chose to float the bond issue even though
the town's bond anticipation notes could have been renewed instead.
Logalbo was aware that Moody's was at that time re-evaluating the bond
ratings of Massachusetts cities and towns, but that no pronouncements
had yet been made by the investment analysts. It was only nine days later
that Moody's suspended bond ratings for 37 municipalities because of the
jeopardy and uncertainty created by Proposition 2-1/2. The suspension
dramatized for the investment community the impending difficulties
that will be faced by Massachusetts communities in complying with the
new limits. Concord managed to avoid this bad publicity by announcing
its issue early.
Other factors that stimulated bids on the Concord issue included
56Lowery, Donald, "Concord Bond Sale is Today, " The Boston Globe, March
18, 1981.
57Ibid.
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the shortage of other issues in the state since passage of Proposition
2-1/2, as well as the "name-issue preference" of investors for the
Town of Concord. One of the two Boston brokerage houses that underwrote
the Concord issue reported that the company managed to sell about 85
percent of the $1.59 million issue withtn one hour of the purchase. By
the end of the day, only 7 percent, or $105,000, remained to be sold.58
Les Gross, Vice President of Burgess & Leith, summarized the factors of
success as follows:
"This being the first issue since the passage of Proposi-
tion 2-1/2, there was quite a bit of pent-up demand. That, com-
bined with the name of Concord, led to the success."59
While it is generally true that the wealthier towns will retain an
attractive position in the bond market, the limit on taxing power will
somewhat hurt their competitive position, all other things being equal.
Every bond issue must have a written certification by a respected bond
counsel that comments on the validity of repayment claims and the securi-
ty behind the debt, the legality of the issue with regard to enabling
legislation, debt limits, etc., and any other relevant information. If
the debt is secured by a locality's unlimited taxing power, this fact
will be included in the legal opinion. Concord was the first Massachu-
setts town to issue a limited tax bond. The legal opinion for this issue,
written by bond counsels from the firm, Palmer & Dodge, reads as follows:
580p. Cit., Donald Lowery, "Concord Issue Sells at 7.3%".
59 Ibid.
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"The bonds are valid general obligation of the town
of Concord, Massachusetts, and the principal of and interest
on the bonds are payable from taxes which may be levied upon
all taxable property in the town, subject to the limit im-
posed by Chapter 59, Section 21C of the general laws." 60
The limitation on local taxing power increases the risk that a
locality will have difficulty meeting principal and interest costs on
long-term debt. If a city or town is taxing at the limit allowed by
law and unexpected expenses occur or service delivery costs increase
significantly, the community will be compelled to choose between main-
taining service delivery at a desired level or keeping up with the debt
service payments. Most municipalities will enter into a default condi-
tion only under the most extreme conditions of duress. There may be
political forces at work, however, that pursue short-term goals of ser-
vice delivery over the less tangible longer-term goal of protecting the
municipality's reputation in the municipal bond market.
It is the assessment of bond market analysts that for Concord, such
a day of reckoning does not loom near in the foreseeable future. Through
the quick absorbtion of the Concord issue, the bond market has indicated
that a tax limit itself need not increase the cost of capital facilities
financing by a large amount.
This finding should be of some comfort to towns in Massachusetts
that are similar to Concord. Such towns can expect some increase in
finance costs compared to a hypothetical identical town with unlimited
60Fitzgerald, Joan, "Mass. Cities and Towns to Sample Bond Market,"
The Boston Globe, March 12, 1981.
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taxing power, but the price increase will likely be rather small. The
question remains- what about towns that are not so similar in fiscal
composition to Concord? This question is addressed in the next chapter,
which anticipates a differential impact of Proposition 2-1./2 on munici-
pal access to the bond market.
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CHAPTER VII. DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS IN CITIES AND TOWNS
This chapter explores a set of fiscal indicators to assess the
vulnerability of any city or town to the effects of Proposition 2-1/2.
The analysis looks at the determinants of bond ratings since the bond
ratings guide investors and underwriters who might bid on a municipal
bond issue.
The bond ratings assigned by Moody's and Standard & Poor's pro-
vide a relative index of the fiscal security behind municipal bond
issues. While the rating agencies are certainly not omnicient, and
the validity of the ratings themselves is the subject of some debate,
these ratings are widely used by investors who are unable themselves
to conduct an independent review of bond issue qualities.
This chapter is in three sections, beginning with an explanation
of the theory behind municipal bond rating analysis. The second
section presents a statistical study of pre-2-1/2 determinants of bond
ratings. A stepwise discriminant analysis program was used to invest-
igate which of a set of fiscal indicators appear to explain the 1980
distribution of bond ratings. Building upon these findings, in the
third section, a subset of indicators was selected to differentiate
between cities and towns based on the prospective impacts of the
2-1/2 initiative. It is assumed that the key deterministic indicators
for bond ratings and bond market access will change significantly
as a result of the changes introduced by Proposition 2-1/2.
In conjunction with an ongoing-project at M.I.T.'s Department
- of Urban Studies and Planning, data were collected for'143 Massachu-
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setts cities and towns- those with population of 10,000 or more in 1970.
Approximately 30 variables per town were assembled from a variety of
centralized data sources, including the Massachusetts State Department
of Revenue, and the 1977 Census of Governments,, among others. The
intention was to pull together a broad range of fiscal and socio-econo-
mic information that the literature suggests is relevant to bond market
performance. A review of a portion of this literature comprises the
following section.
Determinants of Bond Ratings: A Theoretical Overview
What the rating agencies purport to create with the system of
ratings is an index of the amount of risk to the investor associated
with a municipal bond issue. High ratings, Aaa and Aa, reflect a
local fiscal condition that is very secure in the short and long-terms.
One step lower, rating A, indicates short-run fiscal security with
uncertainty about the long-run conditions. Baa-rated securities
reflect concern over the short-run fiscal conditions as well , indicat-
ing a precarious fiscal balance for the community.
Risk to a municipal bond market investor can take several forms.
Most severe is the "ultimate risk" that the issuer will default on its
obligation to meet principal and interest payments as they come due. 61
Also of concern to the investor is his ability to sell the bond in the
secondary trading market "at a relatively good market price prior to
maturity."62  The rating agency examines a variety of data provided
61Op. Cit., John E. Petersen, The Rating Game, p.46.
62Ibid.
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by the municipality to arrive at an assessment of these risks associated
with the issue.
There is a certain mystique surrounding the rating process. Be-
cause reporting practices of local governments vary, and because of
the extreme diversity of local governmental units, there is no precise
system or formula for calculating bond ratings. The ratings are desig-
nated by a select cadre of municipal bond analysts according to a sub-
jective weighting of the trends in fiscal indicators as is explained below.
There has been concern that this rating system could lead to
arbitrary rating practices because of the lack of regulation of the
rating agencies. The agencies, especially Moody's Investors Service,
have responded to these apprehensions by clarifying their assessment
practices and systematizing the rating process to the extent possible.
It remains true, however, that the rating designation is a subjective
process that relies on the judgement, and hence possibly the bias, of
the ratings analysts.
In general, according to Howard Mischel of Moody's Investors
Service, Inc., the rating is determined through examination of fiscal
trend data falling into the following four main categories: 1) economic,
2) debt, 3) financial, and 4) governmental.63 Trends in a community's
economic base reveal what the capacity for debt issuance might be. The
state of the local economy will affect the ability of the locality to
generate revenue through such means as property taxes, sales taxes,
and income taxes. Important economic considerations include family
63Op. Cit., Howard Mischel.
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income, per capita property valuation, employment mix, and the diver-
sity of the tax base. The existing debt burden is an indicator of the
extent to which the community's resource capacity has already been
extended. The relationship between total debt and taxable wealth is
important in the determination of ability to meet future debt service
obligation.
Investigation into financal. trends involves a look at debt issuing
policy and the adequacy of capital planning. The term structure and
repayment schedule of existing debt is also quite important. Govern-
mental factors, especially financial management capacity, are considered
very carefully by the rating agency. Mischel, described these factors
as follows:
"The growing complexity of municipal entities requires
the analyst to take into account numerous administrative
and governmental factors. We look toward a municipality's
organization, diffusion of responsibilities, degree of
professionalism, and sufficiency of powers to perform its
functions. Management controls and the availability and
quality of documents, annual reports, and planning docu-
ments, add to our impressions of administrative performance.
Limitations on taxing power, assessment practices, litigation,
provision of services, and relationship to overlapping
governmental units, are all studied."64
These rating factors are "studied" by the municipal bond analysts
who combine the various criteria according to some implicit weighting
scheme to form the bond rating- a simple letter grade. The communities
are urged to provide to Moody's as much additional information as is
appropriate. Oftentimes, the local officials are unsure about which
64Ibid.
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factors might have caused them to be assigned a low rating, however,
and hence don't know what extra information would be helpful.
In order to gain a clearer understanding of how these factors
translate into bond ratings, and to guide the researcher in collection
of data with which to study this problem, it is valuable to describe
the specific indicators that are used by rating agencies to measure
the fiscal security of an issuing community. In John E. Petersen's
essay in The Rating Game, nine such indicators have been suggested as
the basic criteria necessary to any evaluation of a municipality's
credit, as follows:
1. Current population.
2. True (market) taxable valuations.
3. Gross indebtedness.
4. Net indebtedness (debt after deducting self-sustaining
obligation, sinking funds, state assistance, etc.).
5. Combined indebtedness (including "overlapping debt", i.e.,
the proportionate share of the indebtedness of any other
governmental unit for which the municipality is liable).
6. The ratio of combined debt to population.
7. The ratio of combined debt as a percentage of full market
valuations.
8. The ratio of combined debt as a percentage of per capita
income.
9. The community's historical tax collection record including
levies, collections, and delinquencies.65
65Brenton W. Harries, Financing Municipal Facilities, Vol. II, pp.
197-198, cited by John E. Petersen, in The Rating Game, (Op. Cit.)
p. 78.
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Petersen maintains that three debt ratios are the most important
indicators of municipal credit worthiness.66 The ratio of debt to
property valuation reveals how close to the statutory limit an indebted-
ness (where such limits exist) the community is, as well as the extent
of the existing credit load in the locality. For most cases, a debt
to property value ratio of 10 percent indicates exhaustion of local
debt capacity.67 Debt per capita also measures credit load. For
cities of less than 25,000, it is "unhealthy" to have more than $200
(1967 dollars) in debt per capita. For larger cities that are under
250,000 population, $250 debt per capita is acceptable, and for cities
greater than 250,000, $300 debt per capita is considered reasonable." 68
Perhaps the most direct measure of the current burden of the existing
debt load is the percent of current revenues allocated to debt service.
An allocation of less than 10 percent is preferred in evaluating
credit-worthiness, 15 percent is worrisome, and over 20 percent is
exceptionally bad. 69
Most of the above indicators focus on the debt history of the
locality, which is one important rating factor category. If the debt
category were the sole determinant of bond ratings, then it would be
possible to devise a relatively objective formula based on the above
rules of thumb cited by Petersen. In reality, however, the other
660p. Cit., The Rating Game, pp. 78-79.
67Ibid. (Petersen cites a 1963 study by the Bank Management Committee
of the American Bankers Association.)
68Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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three categories of municipal credit identified by Mischel must also
be considered. Furthermore, the economic and governmental categories,
and to a lesser extent the financial category, tend to be more sub-
jective in nature.
Among the relatively objective financial indicators for which
rule-of-thumb boundary levels exist are the following items: the
percentage of outstanding debt repaid in the previous year should
not be less than 5 percent; a high percentage of capital outlays
should be funded by current revenues; tax collection should be close
to 100 percent of assessments, and not less than 95 percent; combined
ad valorem taxes on property, including overlapping units, preferably
should be under 4 percent; current deficits and short-term borrowing
should be avoided.70
Too much reliance should not be placed on these rule-of-thumb
boundary levels in local credit analysis. Acceptable levels vary
situationally between cities. For example, tax anticipation borrowing
is often necessary to smooth out a lumpy revenue collection schedule,
as is the case in Massachusetts. Furthermore, acceptable levels will
change over time, because of inflation or because of changing views
of what constitutes prudent management policy. Thus, even the most
"objective" criteria will require case-by-case review of the sort
performed by Moody's and Standard & Poor's.
For an overview of the subjective evaluation factors in the socio-
700p. Cit., The Rating Game, p. 79.
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economic and governmental categories, I will defer to a description
by Brenton W. Harries that is reproduced in Petersen's essay in The
Rating Game. Harries poses the following questions that must also
be considered about a community:
"Is it a one industry community? Is there diversification
in industry? Is there a heavy dependence on extractive
industry? What are its leading sources of income? What is
the percentage of industry contribution to the tax base?
Other pertinent facts relative to the economy of the area
are: Is the community a resort area, subject to wide econo-
mic swings? What are the value of its homes, its income
levels, relative wealth, personal savings, etc.? Is the
community the location of a major shopping center and related
commercial activities, etc.?
The character of the community plays a vital part in
its overall evaluation. What are the educational attain-
ments of its residents? What percentage of its homes are
owner-occupied? Is there evidence of civic pride, of
active community programs for recreation and cultural acti-
vities, etc.?
In examining the indebtedness of a community, weight must
be given to its past record: its current indebtedness and
future financing needs. Does it have a sound capital
improvement program? What is its schedule of debt retire-
ments? Is it 2borrowing margin within legal debt limita-
tions, etc.?"
Harries mentions the character of the community as one important
factor. Within this factor are some other attributes that also appear
to be significant, including the racial, ethnic, religious, and politi-
cal make-up of the community. Part of the problem faced by communities
undergoing a rating evaluation is that they have no way of knowing
which of these many factors are most important in their rating deter-
mination. If it was clear that a change in an indicator would boost
720p. Cit., Brenton W. Harries, p. 198.
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the rating, then the community could work toward such a change. As
it is, the multiplicity of factors and indicators might serve to
illuminate the theory of bond rating determinations while obfuscating
the actual decision criteria for a given case.
The next section reviews a number of quantitative analyses
that have used cross-sectional statistical methods to reveal which
of the various indicators most adequately explain the bond ratings
for a sample of cities and towns. One such study, using stepwise
discriminant analysis, was undertaken for the larger cities and towns
of Massachusetts using the data assembled for this thesis. Comparing
the results of the studies reveals that the most significant deter-
minants vary according to the sample characteristics and when the
analysis was undertaken. These issues are discussed below.
Determinants of Bond Ratings: A Quantitative Approach
When Moody's performs a rating analysis for a city or town, the
locality supplies the agency with as much of the relevant data as is
available. A problem for the researcher is to assemble a comparable
data base for a large enough sample to permit a cross-sectional statisti-
cal analysis. For this study, I have collected as many of the indica-
tors identified in the previous section as were readily accessible for
a large number of Massachusetts communities. Major data sources include
the 1977 Census of Governments, the 1970 Census, and the Massachusetts
State Department of Revenue.
The analysis was restricted to those cities and towns whose popu-
lation was 10,000 or greater in 1970, because detailed Census of
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Governments financial data are available for these units.
From these data, 15 indicators were derived or selected
for inclusion in the stepwise discriminant analysis. These variables
include:
1. FRES- Percentage of property tax base that is residential.
2. AVGINC- Per capita income.
3. FOWNER- Percentage of residences that are owner-occupied.
4. POP80- Population, 1980, in thousands.
5. PCHG7080- Percent change in population from 1970 to 1980.
6. TDOPEQV- Total debt outstanding expressed as a percentage
of equalized (full market) valuation in 1980.
7. TDOPC- Total debt outstanding per capita in 1980.
8. ETR- Effective property tax rate in 1980, (mill rate).
9. TDOPAV- Total debt outstanding expressed as a percentage
of assessed valuation in 1980.
10. PTXPC- Property tax per capita in 1980.
11. EQV- Equalized (full market) property valuation in 1980.
12, IGDPGE- Interest on general debt expressed as a percentage
of general expenditures in 1977.
13. IRPTR- Intergovernmental revenue expressed as a percentage
of total revenues in 1977.
14. STDPTDO- short term debt expressed as a percentage of
total debt outstanding in 1977.
15. Y25- Number of years it will take to reach the 2-1/2
percent property tax limit in compliance with Propo-
sition 2-1/2.
16. MOODY- Moody's rating, 1980.
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The goal of the stepwise multiple discriminant analysis* is to
select a subset of these variables that allows the most accurate predic-
tion of the Moody's bond rating assigned to each city and town in the
sample. While this technique reveals which variables will maximize
the prediction, the coefficients of the classification function are not
as rich as those in a regression analysis, for example, which can show
the elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to the indepen-
dent variables.
Donald L. Rubinfeld devised a regression program for categorical
data that he applied to the bond ratings of 128 northeastern U.S. cities
and towns.2b Rubinfeld was able to predict 67 percent of the ratings
(into four rating categories- Aaa, Aa, A, Baa) using the regression
technique, and 68 percent using multiple discriminant analysis. His
explanatory variables included: 1) the ratio of debt to assessed
valuation (negative coefficient); 2) assessed full value (positive
coeffient); 3) overall net debt (negative coefficient) 4) median
family income (positive coefficient); 5) rate of growth in the population
The stepwise program 72a chooses one additional variable on each pass
through the data that optimizes the predictions according to a "classi-
fication function." The classification function consists of a constant
term and a coefficient for each variable for each category. Every
observation (city or town) is assigned to the rating category that
yields the highest value of the classification function.
72aBMDP7M- Stepwise Discriminant Analysis, Department of Biomathematics,
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 1980.
72bRubinfeld, Daniel Lee, An Econometric Analysis of the Market For
General Obligation Bonds, Ph.D. Dissertation, Unpublished, M.I.T.,
June 1972, pp. 56-73
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(negative coefficient for high growth); 6) percent- of taxes uncollected
in previous year(negative coefficient); and 7) dummy variable for state.
Another study of bond ratings using stepwise multiple analysis
was carried out by Aronson and Marsden in 1980 using data from Moody's
on "25 Leading U.S. Cities". 72c Very high predictive accuracy, (83%),
was attained when nine explanatory variables were used to predict bond
ratings into five categories. Interestingly, the best single variable
was the percent of population in the city that is black. Accuracy of
63 percent was achieved when the percent of black population was excluded,
and 42 percent of the ratings could be predicted by the variable alone.
For the analysis of Massachusetts' pre-2-1/2 bond ratings, no such
racial variable was included. A direct comparison between the results
of the studies is difficult because of the different rating categories
selected for each study and because of the differences in the samples.
Rubinfeld's study is more similar to this analysis in that he selected
a diverse sample of New England cities and towns rather than the 25
largest cities included in Aronson and Marsden. In this study, the
sample size was reduced to 141 Massachusetts communities because
two towns had no rating assigned to them. Ratings ranged from Aaa,
of which there were six, to Baa, of which there were also six. There
are actually six categories of ratings within this range rather than
the four described earlier, because Moody's differentiates between "low"
72cAronson, Richard J. and James R. Marsden, "Duplicating Moody's
Municipal Credit Ratings", Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1.,
January 1980, pp. 97-107.
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and "high" cities in the A and Baa categories. A high. A-rating is
denoted as Al; similarly, a high Baa is denoted as Baal.
The stepwise discriminant analysis program selected three of the
15 explanatory variables to discriminate between the six bond rating
categories. The first variable selected was ETR, followed by PTXPC,
and the third was FOWNER. The accuracy level that was achieved using
these three variables and all six rating categories was only 49.6
percent. All six of the Aaa ratings were correctly c1assified, and
most of the other ratings were predicted within one rating of the
actual category. Table 4 presents the classification matrix from this
solution. The correct classification predictions are underscored.
A second program was run in which the rating categories were
collapsed into three groups. Table 5 shows this classification matrix,
which is considerably more accurate, although less detailed than the
six category matrix. The rating categories were reduced by including
Baal in category Baa, Al in category A, and by collapsing Aaa and Aa into
a single category called "AAAAA".
Not only does the three category analysis succeed in predicting
more cases correctly than the six category analysis, with a 70 percent
success rate, but it is also easier to see the relationship between
the indicators and the ratings with fewer categories. Table 6 shows
the means for all of the selected indicators within each of the three
classifications of bond ratings.
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TABLE 4
CLASSIFICATION MATRIX USING SIX RATING CATEGORIES
(Explanatory Variables: ETR, PTXPC, FOWNER)
Percent
Group Correct
Predicted Number of Cases Classified into Group:
Aaa
100.0 6
35,0
30.3
8
3
63.5 3
100.0 0
50.0 0
Aa Al A Baal
0 0 0
14
7
9 7
10 11
2 8 33
0 0 0
1 0 0
Total 49.6 20 24 27 51
TABLE 5
CLASSIFICATION MATRIX USING THREE
(Explanatory Variables: ETR,
Percent Predicted Number of Cases
Correct AAAAA A
65.2
75.3
90.0
30
16
1
14
64
0
RATING CATEGORIES
PTXPC, FOWNER)
Classified into Group:
Baa
2
5
9
47 78 16
Aaa
Aa
Al
A
Baa 1
Baa
0
1
1
5
4
2
13
Baa
0
1
1
1
0
3
6
Actual
Total in
Group
6
40
33
52
4
6
141
Group
AAAAA
A
Baa
Actual
Total in
Group
46
85
10
141Total 73.0
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TABLE 6
MEAN VALUES OF INDICATORS WITHIN THREE RATING CATEGORIES
Variable
1. FRES
2. AVGINC
3. FOWNER
4. POP80
5. PCHG708
6. TDOPE:V
7. TDOPC
8. ETR
9. TDOPAV
10. PTXPC
11. EQV
12. IGDP3ES
13. IRPTR
14. STDPTDO
15. Y25
16. MOODY
Units
(01)
(000's)
0 ()
(2g)
($)
(mi ls)
($)
(3 millions)
(5)
(%)
(years)
AAAAA
70.41
11.86
67.13
35.95
2.04
2.20
312.58
39.44
4.28
591.34
510.97
2.49
23.57
3.95
3.09
1.87
Group
A-
70.73.'
10.77
72.72
23.91
6.70
2.60
288.30
37.55
6.28
458.50
279.31
2.94
29.99
3.24
3.03
3.61
Baa
57.00
7.89
40.74
123.20
-6.53
5.63
385.30
65.25
16.14
453.19
795.71
4.62
39.62
13.40
6.14
5.60
All Groups
69.65
10.92
68.63
34.88
4.24
2.69
303.10
40.13
6.33
501.46
391.51
2.91
28.58
4.19
3.27
3.18
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Table 6 provides some useful insights into the determinants of
bond ratings. First, a scan of the mean values of indicators reveals
that many variables do not rise or fall monotonically across rating
categories. The percentage of residences that are owner occupied,
(FOWNER), for example, is lower in the AAAAA category (67%) than in
the A category (73%) and the Baa category is considerably lower than
either of the others (41%). Full market property valuation is higher
for the highest rated category ($510 million) than the middle category
($279 million), and the lowest rated cities and towns have the highest
average at $796 million.
As the Moody's spokesmen claim, the ratings are based on the inter-
active effects of the indicators, so that no indicator alone can be
expected to reveal much about the ratings. The effective tax rate (ETR)
was the first variable selected out by the program as a predictor of
bond ratings. Recalling the rule-of-thumb from the previous section
that this indicator is best kept under four percent, the rule is validated
by Table 6. The highest rated communities show a mean ETR of just
under 4 percent, while the lowest rated communities have the high mean
of 6.5 percent.
It is somewhat surprising (to me) to note that the property tax
per capita (PTXPC) is best at high levels as far as ratings are con-
cerned. This finding is quite logical, however, when the PTXPC and
ETR are considered together. A high value for PTXPC coupled with a
value for ETR of less than 40 mills indicates a "rich" tax base and
therefore good debt carrying capacity. The lowest rating category
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exhibits a very high tax rate but still a low property tax per capita.
This combination implies a relatively scant capacity to raise additional
revenue to meet debt service requirements.
To summarize the thrust of the results of the discriminant analysis,
it seems that the best ratings are assigned to communities with a high-
yield tax base. Residential neighborhoods in which there is a high
percentage of owner-occupied housing are generally wealthier, less dense,
and have higher property values in relation to service costs than rental
dominated residential neighborhoods. High taxes per capita generated
by a low property tax rate indicate that there is a high elasticity of
revenues with respect to the tax rate.
These three indicators have been shown to be statistically impor-
tant determinants of the bond ratings in Massachusetts in 1980. Table
6 shows that a number of other indicators are also important factors.
One item that is striking, and at first blush counter-intuitive, is
the relationship between IRPTR and Moody's ratings. IRPTR, inter-
governmental revenue as a share of total revenue, is shown to be
significantly lower for the highest rated communities (with a mean
value of 24%) than for the lowest rated communities (with a mean of
40%). The A rated communities fall between, at 30%.
What the data tell us is that a high reliance upon the property
tax is actually preferred by the rating agency (and hence is better
for the bond market) over a reliance on intergovernmental (i.e. state
and federal) revenue sources. This finding is rather surprising to
a student of economics and public finance who was taught that revenue
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sharing from the federal to the local level is more efficient in both
an allocative and distributional sense. The allocative efficiency
relates to the supposed freedom from behavioral distortion associated
with a broad based federal income tax. The local property tax is fre-
quently criticized as causing distortions in residential and business
locational decisions, although many analysts assert that such distortions
are minimal. A similar controversy exists as to the relative merits
of the present property tax system compared to the present income tax
system regarding the progressivity or regressivity of either. For
all its failings or perceived failings, however, the rating agencies
believe that a community with a relatively high reliance on the property
tax compared to intergovernmental revenues is a better credit risk than
a community that relies less upon the property tax for local revenues.
The property tax is preferred as a local revenue source mainly
because it offers both control and flexibility to the local government.
Such control and flexibility can be vitally important to a municipality
on the threshold of serious financial difficulty. In his book, The
Appraisal of Municipal Credit Risk, Wade S. Smith describes the processes
by which cities can be overcome by financial difficulties.73 Financial
problems usually begin with a current cash deficit, and the problem
will continue and worsen if such deficits are allowed to recur. Smith
cites either revenue failure or over-expenditure as the initial prob-
lem,. for which corrective action is necessary. The ability of a
municipality to take the necessary remedial steps depends largely
7 3 Smith, Wade S., The Appraisal of Municipal Credit Risk, Moody's In-
vestors Service, New York, N.Y., 1979, pp. l11-126.
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upon the extent to which local revenues are derived from property taxes.
Smith explains this relationship between fiscal security and the prop-
erty tax as follows:
"A state or local governmental unit on the threshold
of serious financial difficulty can escape it, but time
is short and decisive action is necessary. Experience
suggests that the causes of the difficulty must be addressed
in the budget for the year following that in which severe
revenue failure or over-expenditure occurs...
The danger to be avoided is the unwieldy accumulation
of operating debt- an unmanageable cumulative cash deficiency,
with resulting cash stringency. The remedy is to liquidate
the deficit, whether by increasing revenues or by reducing
expenditures, or by a combination of the two...
The general property tax is the balancing element in
most local government budgets, the one revenue item ordinarily
variable by the local governing body independently of state
or federal legislative bodies. It is frequently subject to
legal limitations, however, and it is always subject to
economic limitations.
Because it is the balancing element in the budget, the
property tax is a particularly suitable base for the measure-
ment of the potential difficulty of eliminating an accumulated
cash deficiency. Also, because of the decline in the relative
importance of the property tax as a revenue source, it is
a more sensitive indicator than total revenues.. .If a unit
has a 50% dependency on the property tax, it is clear that
a deficiency equal to 5% of total revenues will be equal
to 10% of the property tax, while at 40% dependency, it
would equal 12.5% of property taxes, and at 30% dependency,
17%."174
Thus it would seem that Massachusetts municipalities, famous for
their "over-reliance" on the property tax, will be losing a signifi-
cant credit advantage as Proposition 2-1/2 goes into effect. The
assertion by Smith that a high proportion of revenues derived from the
property tax is highly regarded in the municipal bond market is clearly
reflected by the characteristics of the variable IRPTR in Table 6.
The degree to which this lost advantage will jeopardize municipal
74Ibid.
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standing in the credit market depends directly upon local fiscal condi-
tions in a given city or town. We have seen that the town of Concord
has suffered no competitive loss in her ability to sell bonds thus far.
Other cities and towns are less fortunate, however. The question then
becomes which cities and towns are more vulnerable and how can this
vulnerability be determined?
This question is the subject of the next section. Thinking pro-
spectively about the future under Proposition 2-1/2, one can deduce
(albeit with no statistical security) which of the 15 indicators might
emerge as the decisive determinants of market acceptance of local bond
issues from this state.
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Determinants of Municipal Vulnerability to Proposition 2-1/2
Municipal vulnerability to the bond market impacts of Proposition
2-1/2 is a function of at least the following three factors: 1) the
fiscal condition of the municipality before the imposition of Proposi-
tion 2-1/2; 2) the extent of the revenue cutbacks mandated by the tax
limit law; and 3) the current local requirements for long-term capital
borrowing. These factors taken together will determine whether or not
a municipality will need to approach the bond market, and if so, how the
market will appraise the credit risk associated with the bond issue.
One needn't do much analysis to identify the city that is probably
in the worst shape financially. Boston is almost a text book case of
fiscal stress in a large city. On the revenue side, there is the short-
fall caused by the 2-1/2 mandated auto excise tax reduction, coupled with
court-ordered property tax rebates stemming from a ruling known as the
Tregor case.75 To compensate certain property owners for improper
assessment practices which resulted in commercial taxes being levied at
a higher rate than residential property taxes, the city is required to
pay tax rebates amounting to about $90 million.76 Contributing to the
city's fiscal problems on the expenditure side of the budget is the
75Cowen, Peter, "Fiscal Crises: Boston's Week for Decisions," The Bos-
ton Globe, April 7, 1981, p. 19.
76Eisner, Alan, "Money Woes Unforeseen, System Paralyzed (says) White,"
Boston Herald American, May 5, 1981, p. A4.
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overspending by the School Department in 1981 of up to $40 million.
Political stalemate has thus far frustrated all attempts by the
Mayor and the City Council to forge a financial solution to the im-
pending crisis. The Mayor would like to float a long-term bond issue
of $90 million, and the council has proposed a $75 million issue, to
pay off the property tax rebates. The political snafu over mayoral
powers has precluded any agreement necessary for a bond authorization.
Without such a bond issue, the city will have to fund the rebates and
the School Department's over-spending out of current revenues in fiscal
year 1982, which must also be reduced by 15% to comply with Proposition
2-1/2.
Boston seems to have every fiscal problem in the book- revenue
shortfall, mandated property tax rebate, over-expenditure, declining
population, deteriorated infrastructure, and a strict tax limitation.
Assuming no changes in the tax limit law, Boston will take 10 years
of 15% cuts in the tax levy to reach the 2-1/2 % tax rate, according
to calculations based on data from the Massachusetts Taxpayers Founda-
tion.78 With such a tenuous financial situation which places the city
almost at the brink of bankruptcy, it is very likely that if Boston
does float a large bond issue, the interest rate will be very high.
The problems that are currently facing the City of Boston have
made the city very prominent in the media as the threat of a major urban
7 Op. Cit., "Boston's Week for Decisions.
78Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Inc., Municipal Financial Data, 1980.
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bankruptcy grows more imminent. It is more difficult, however, to dis-
cern which other cities and towns in the state are also facing serious
financial problems. Clearly, in Boston, all three factors listed above
tend toward a high vulnerability to bond market impacts. This study
examines how these factors might reveal such vulnerability in the remain-
der of the cities and towns in the sample.
The 143 communities in the sample are quite diverse, so they have
been categorized across two dimensions- population size, and recent
growth trends. The sample includes only those municipalities with popu-
lation greater than 10,000. These units were divided into three popula-
tion groups: those with population between 10,000 and 25,000; those units
with population between 25,000 and 50,000, those larger than 50,000.
Recognizing that many of the older cities have experienced a
pronounced loss in popoulation over the last 10 years, while others
have grown significantly over this period, three growth categories have
also been specified. Declining cities and towns are defined as those
with a population decrease between 1970 and 1980 of greater than 4 per-
cent. Growth communities are specified as those with a population in-
crease of greater than four percent. Those communities whose population
change over the decade fell beteen plus or minus four percent were
classified as stable.
The 143 cities and towns were cross-classified by these two dimensions
to form nine groups or clusters of communities. The breakpoints were
chosen subjectively by examining the distributions of communities;
other groupings might also be appropriate. The reason for clustering
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the sample this way is to create relatively homogenous groups so that
fiscal characteristics falling outside the norm for each group can be
spotted. It is believed that there may be major differences between
communities because of size or growth trends that do not really reflect
differing fiscal conditions in the sense that is intended here.
In conducting rating evaluation, the rating agencies recognize
that there will be differences in the values of fiscal indicators be-
tween communities of different sizes. Moody's Investor's Service,
for example, distributes guidances for its analysts showing the range
in values of net debt per capita and net debt ratio to estimated full
value. The low, median and high values for these ratios are listed by
Moody's for nine population groups of cities.
Table 7 shows how the Massachusetts communities are distributed
between the categories defined by population size and growth rate.
TABLE 7
Distribution of Sample Communities Into Population and Growth Clusters
PCHG 7080
Declinin Stable Growing Total
POP80 Number %) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
10,000 to 25,000 11 (7.7) 36 (25.2) 35 (24.5) 82 (57.3)
25,000 to 50,000 16 (11.2) 13 (9.1) 11 (7.7) 40 (28.0)
50,000 and over 15 (10.5) 5 (3.5) 1 (.7) 21 (14.7)
Total 42 (29.4) 54 (37.8) 47 (32..9) 143
It is difficult to assess the need for long-term capital borrowing
for a large sample of communities. Individually, one can examine
capital spending plans or special capital needs such as in the case of
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Boston. Another indicator of capital requirements that is centrally
available, (but not included in the data file that has been compiled
for this study), is the amount of bond anticipation notes, (BANs), have
been issued by cities and towns over the past two years. BANs are
issued by localities that intend to float a bond issue within two years,
but desire some initial funding earlier than the scheduled issue. Fre-
quently a number of separate capital improvement projects will be under-
taken within a span of several years, which can be aggregated into a
single large bond issue. Such finance packages save on the fixed ex-
penses, such as advertising, printing, and attorneys' fees, that are
incurred for a bond issuance. A community will also issue a BAN to
avoid entering the bond market when interest rates are high, with the
hope or assumption that the rates will fall in the future. There is
a certain amount of investment strategy that requires risk taking on the
part of local government- such as whether to enter the bond market today
and risk getting locked-in to a high interest rate, or to postpone bor-
rowing and risk even higher rates. (Such "playing-the-market' is what
Anthony Logalbo did very successfully when Concord sold a bond issue
last March.)
Bond anticipation notes are one mechanism available to municipal
borrowers that allows for flexibility in bond issuance decisions. State
law in Massachusetts requires that such notes be retired with long-term
funding within two years. From information about BAN issues, therefore,
one can determine which cities and towns are due to enter the bond mar-
ket for long-term issues. There are proposals in the legislature, how-
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ever, that might extend the two year limit on BANs.
The purposes for which long-term borrowing is required will vary
according to the size and growth characteristics of the commuity. The
growing communities require additional new infrastructure- roads, water
and sewer systems, utilities, public buildings, etc.- to support the
increases in population. As will be discussed in Part III, many of
these new capital expenditures can be financed by revenue bonds instead of
general obligation bonds.
The larger cities (over 50,000) are generally declining in popula-
tion, and will need capital for replacement of worn-out existing infra-
structure more than for additional facilities. Boston needs to borrow
to pay the property tax rebates, but this is probably a special case.
These points are raised but not resolved in this study. A quantitative
assessment of long-term capital needs for Massachusetts cities and towns
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The extent of the revenue cutbacks mandated by Proposition 2-1/2,
on the other hand, is accessible information. The tax limit law requires
a local unit to reduce its tax levy by 15 percent per year until the tax
rate is reduced to 2-1/2 percent. A city with a pre-2-1/2 tax levy that
is exactly 15 percent over the 2-1/2 percent target levy would achieve the
required limit in one year. The number of years that the community
must incur a 15 percent levy cutback is used as the indicator of the
extent of cutbacks required by Proposition 2-1/2, (factor 2 above).
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From the investor or rating agency perspective, repeated revenue
cutbacks at the local level pose a threat to bond security. Such cut-
backs will have to be reflected in comparableaexpenditure reductions that
will adversely affect the adequacy or quality of service delivery. Falling
levels of service delivery, in turn, are likely to create pressure on
city government to restore services to former or "reasonable" levels.
These pressures will manifest themselves as political lobbying or pro-
tests and demonstrations, such as the ones that have already taken place
in Boston in response to the closing of police stations in certain
neighborhoods, Resistance to service cuts is likely to be vocal and
politically threatening. The bond holder is very uncomfortable knowing
that a shrinking local budget must be divided between debt service pay-
ments and service delivery requirements. The existence of a tax limit
strips away the insulation from political forces that is usually afforded
a full faith and credit general obligation bond.
Every year that the levy must be reduced adds intensity to the stress
and pressures on the city government. One of the factors considered
by Moody's in suspending ratings last March was the number of years that
a tax reduction would be required. The ability of a community to absorb
these revenue reductions depends upon the first factor listed at the
start of this section- the "fiscal condition" of local units prior to
2-1/2.
Fiscal condition is a vague term that will gain definition through
the selection of indicators to answer the following question: What fac-
tors will become important in the appraisal of credit risk as Proposition
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2-1/2 is being implemented over the next several years? The discriminant
analysis in the previous section demonstrated that the effective tax
rate (ETR), property tax per capita (PTXPC), and percent of residences
that are owner occupied (FOWNER) are the best indicators for predicting
ratings within the set of 15 variables tested. Other than ETR, these
variables do not seem to shed much light on post-2-l/2 creditworthiness.
One of the factors mentioned by Petersen in his discussion of bond.
rating determinants is the extent to which a community has exhausted its
debt capacity. Recalling the rules-of-thumb on credit load, the ratio
of debt to property value should not exceed 10 percent; debt per
capita should not exceed $200 in communities of less than 25,000, or
$250 to $300 for larger cities; and debt service should comprise less
than 10 percent of current revenues.
I believe that these credit load indicators will emerge as the
more important indicators of post-2-1/2 credit risk. In the absence of
a tax limit, debt capacity is determined either by statutory limit, or
by economic constraints on the amount of taxes that will be tolerated
by the voters. The latter constraint is never sharply defined, until
the tolerance limit has been surpassed, as has evidently occurred in
Massachusetts. Under the current tax limit law, which allows no exemp-
tion for debt service taxes, the ceiling on debt capacity has dropped
significantly. Investors and rating analysts will therefore want to look
very closeTy at the three credit load indicators to spot those communities
that might be overextended or close to their limits already.
After Proposition 2-1/2, the rating agencies will probably recon-
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sider the relative advantages or disadvantages of a high proportion
of local revenues from intergovernmental sources. In a previous section,
Wade S. Smith described how a percentage increase in local revenues
would require a larger percentage increase in property taxes, depending
upon the proportion of local revenues that is supplied by the property
tax. This "multiplier effect" also works in reverse. If property taxes
comprise 75 percent of local revenues. and must be cut by 15 percent,
then local revenues will fall by 11.25 percent. If property taxes com-
prise only 50 percent of local revenues, then the same levy reduction
will decrease local revenues by only 7.5 percent. Thus while before
Proposition 2-1/2 was passed, a high proportion of revenues from property
taxes was advantageous, this advantage has diminished after Proposition
2-1/2. Nonetheless, the wealthier towns are still the ones with the
smallest share of intergovernmental revenue, so,IRPTR will not indicate
a poor credit risk at low values of the indicator.
Finally, one of the forementioned debt ratios serves doubly well
as an indicator. The interest on general debt as a proportion of current
revenues, (expressed in the data file as a proportion of general expendi-
tures (IGDPGE) which is essentially the same concept) serves as an indica-
tion of credit load on one hand, and as an indicator of the burden of
expenditure cuts on the other. Debt service is one of several expendi-
ture items that is "fixed", i.e., is set contractually and cannot be
altered at the discretion of local government. Other fixed expenditures
include pension contributions and assessments by overlapping jurisdictions.
Some analysts include such things as emergency service personnel, but
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these items are very ambiguous as to what constitutes a minimum adequate
service level.
Ideally, the indicator would be fixed expenditures as a percent of
current revenues (or expenditures) but data limitations encourage use
of IGDPGE instead. The familiar logic applies again here, that if 20
percent of the current budget is allocated to fixed costs, and expendi-
tures must be reduced by 15 percent, then non-fixed expenditures must be
cut by 18.75 percent.
The indicators I have chosen include the following: 1) TDOPEQV;
2) TDOPC; and 3) IGDPGE. Rather than rely on Petersen's rules-of-thumb,
the selection procedure will be to calculate the mean and standard devia-
tion for these variables within the nine population/ growth-trend clusters,
and to search for those cities and towns with one or more indicator values
that are 1.5 standard deviation units above the group mean. Table 8 shows
the municipalities with their respective indicator scores that have been
identified by this process.
The results displayed in Table 8 show 24 municipalities that will
be worse off compared to other communities within the cluster. This
classification system is rough at best, but it does provide some insight
into the extent of difficulties that will be faced by these communities.
Of these indicators, the combination of a high Y25 with a high value for
IGDPGE probably implies a very difficult expenditure cutback process in
those communities.
The next chapter considers what are the options for local governments.
A brief summary of the bond market options at the local level plus a re-
view of legislative proposals at the state level are included.
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TABLE 8 (cont'd.)
STABLE: 25,000 to 50,000
Y25 TDOPEQV
Group Means:
Braintree
Revere
Taunton
3.5 years
3.5
6.9
4.0
STABLE: 50,000 and Over
Y25
Group Means
3.4%
14.9
TDOPEQV
4.6 years 4.6%
New Bedford 5.2
GROWTH: 10,000 to 25,000
Y25
Group Means 2.3 years
Amesbury 4.7
Burlington 3.4
Milford 3.4
Sharon 3.8
GROWTH: 25,000 to 50,000
Y25
Group Means 2.4 years
Billerica 4.1
Marlborough 3.9
Westfiled
9.5
TDOPEQV
2.0%
8.1
4.6
6.4
TDOPEQV
2.7%
5.8
5.9
2.6
Mean for 143 Communities:
3.3 years 2.2% $196 2.7%
TDOPC.
$366
817
IGDPGE
3.8%
16.0
1058
TDOPC
$386
582
TDOPC
$269
634
901
632
TDOPC.
$346
691
669
IGDPGE
2.8%
5.1
IGDPGE
2.4%
6.4
5.8
5.1
IGDPGE
3.5%
9.1
DECLINING: 10,000 to 25,000
Y25 TDOPEQV-
Group Means:
Clinton
Danvers
Holliston
DECLINING:
Group Means:
Holyoke
Natick
Peabody
Salem
DECLINING:
Group Means:
Boston
Worcester
2.7 (years)
2.8
2.2
3.0
2.4%
5.6
843
5.4
25,000 to 50,000
Y25
4.0
5.4
3.1
4.1
4.5
TDOPEQV
(Years) 2.5%
8.3
6.0
5.9
50,000 and Over
Y25 TDOPEQV
5.9 (years)
10.3
6.7
4.4%
14.0
STABLE: 10,000 to 25,000
Y25
Group Means:
Millbury
Reading
Saugus
2.9 (years)
4.1
3.0
3.5
TDOPEQV
2.2%
5.6
Webster 2.9
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TABLE 8
TDOPC IGDPGE
$282 2.5%
TDOPC
$290
IGDPGE
3.3%
13.1
16.4
TDOPC
$342
834
IGDPGE
2.7%
6.9
TDOPC
$279
IGDPGE
2.9%
11.7
13.4
8.5 663
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PART III.
COPING WITH THE BOND MARKET IMPACTS
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CHAPTER VIII. STATE AND LOCAL STRATEGIES
In both the private sector and the public sector, when capital
improvements needs are neglected, the ensuing problems are perceived only
gradually and over the long term. Unlike industry, cities cannot fold
or relocate when the capital facilities are worn out and obsolete. It
is incumbent upon local governments to supply, maintain, and replace
urban infrastructure in a continuous process that meets current needs
and anticipates future demands. There is a responsibility to the future
to have facilities in place as they are needed, and the-municipal bond
market allows the costs of such facilities to be shifted forward to the
ultimate beneficiaries.
As cities and towns struggle to cope with the reduced revenue levels
mandated by Proposition 2-1/2, it is likely that capital improvements
will be postponed or abandoned as municipalities gear up for crisis
management. Many local governments are facing several years of consecu-
tive 15 percent budget cuts. During this transitional period, capital
spending for most places can and perhaps should be postponed in the
short-term until the local conditions begin to stabilize. But plans for
resumption of capital spending need to be formulated quickly.
For local governments there are long-term financing strategies that
will maximize the degree of local control and minimize the adverse im-
pacts of the tax limit law. As for the state legislature, there are
several decisions to be made about proposed corrective measures for
Proposition 2-1/2. The key legislative proposals will be discussed
briefly in the next section, followed by a section on local options.
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State Legislative Options
When Proposition 2-1/2 passed in November, many observers felt that
because the law is a statutory proposal rather than a constitutional
amendment, the legislature would promptly pull out the teeth of the bill.
On the contrary, the legislature has been very slow to change any part
of the law, and communities are now planning budgets for next fiscal
year that reflect the full force of the tax cuts.
The Legislature's Taxation Committee made a preliminary move on
April 29, 1981 by proposing several modifications to the tax limit bill. 79
Gerald Cohen of Andover, the committee's House Chairman proposed a change
that would allow communities to hold an override vote at any time that
would enable the locality to postpone half of the budget cuts for one
year. Current law does not permit an override vote until November, 1982.
The override proposal, dubbed the "7-1/2 percent solution", would give
communities the right to vote for the more gradual levy reduction of 7-1/2
percent per year instead of the required 15 percent per year reduction.
Two other significant proposals included one to allow communities
to add the value on new buildings to their tax base, and another "loop-
hole" allowing communities to decide by 55% approval in a referendum,
to increase the tax ceiling as necessary to pay off new bond issues.
These proposals would go far to neutralize the bond market impacts of
Proposition 2-1/2. But there is a great deal of uncertainty still as
to whether any of these proposals will be enacted.
79Associated Press, "Tax Panel Moves to Ease Bite of 2-1/2", The Boston
Globe, April 30, 1981, pp. 13, 16.
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The legislature is hesitant about altering Proposition 2-1/2 for at
least two reasons. First, the initiative passed with a very strong
majority of voters supporting it, almost 60% in favor. The state repre-
sentatives are justifiably cautious in taking steps that will dilute the
reductions mandated by Proposition 2-1/2. It would be a mistake to
presume, however, that the voters would not accept alterations to the
law to make it a more balanced piece of legislation. I contend that the
"message" behind Proposition 2-1/2 is directed not only at the tax sys-
tem, about which voters have been grumbling for years, but it is also
directed at the legislature for its unwillingness to work aggressively
and decisively toward reform of a system that has long been regarded as
problematic. To interpret the strong vote for 2-1/2 as a sign that the
legislature should accept the bill as is rather than forge it into a
reform measure, I believe is a misinterpretation of the signals.
If Proposition 2-1/2 is a rejection of the status quo, it is also
an opportunity to reorder the structure of the tax system in a compre-
hensive, rather than piecemeal fashion. In a conversation with Mike
Meyers, an analyst working for the Legislative Committee on Taxation,
I asked whether the committee was likely to endorse the proposed change
int the tax limit that would allow for new development to be added to
the tax base, since there does not appear to be opposition to such a
change from any interest group. Meyers explained that no such proposal
would be endorsed by itself, precisely because it is a popular alteration.
Instead, the committee would work toward a comprehensive reform package
that would tie elimination of the "no-growth" aspect of the bill with
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other provisions and amendments. This political strategy will leverage
the support for the popular changes to improve the chances of passage
for the "comprehensive" measures. Another possibility is that the
legislative committee will leave Proposition 2-1/2 as is so that a com-
prehensive reform package that will completely replace the 2-1/2 initia-
tive will have a chance of getting enacted. If this is the strategy,
then communities will very likely have to live with the full force of
Proposition 2-1/2 for some time, as the legislature plots its course.
A state level option that holds little promise, but which nonethe-
less warrants mention is the creation of a statewide bond banking system.
Bond banks have been established in Vermont in 1970, and in Maine in 1972,
to provide access to long-term credit markets to communities which have
difficulty issuing debt independently due to their small size.80 The bond
bank is a statewide structure to which municipalities can apply to
participate in a package bond issuance. The bank collects information
from applicants similar to the data required by Moody's, and the bank can
reject participation by applicants which will unduly jeopardize the issue.
When the bank has accumulated at least $6 million in finance needs,
it will prepare a bond issue for 10 percent greater than the sum of the
component issues. The excess funds are used as a reserve fund, (equal
to one year's debt service obligations) and the income earned on this
fund is adequate to cover overhead and expenses from operation of the
bond bank. The security behind the issue is first the reserve fund,
second the full faith and credit of the participant local units, third
is a lien on state aid to the localities, and fourth the moral obligation
30Katzman, Martin T., "Municipal Bond Banking: The Diffusion of a Public
Finance Innovation," National Tax Journal, Vol 33, No. 2, June 1980,pp. 149-160.
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of the state's general revenues.
Since the "bottom line" of the debt security is the state's moral
obligation, the entire issue is usually rated one rating below the
state's rating. In the case of Massachusetts, which is rated 'A' by
Moody's, the bond bank issue would be rated Baa, which makes it a very
unattractive idea. Few municipalities in this state would have reason
to participate with that low rating. While the bond bank might prove
adaptable to Massachusetts, it was conceived to aid small unrated
communities. Some modification would be necessary for the system to
have any value in aiding fiscally squeezed cities and towns in Massachu-
setts. In short, the idea holds little promise as a solution to local
credit difficulties.
Local Options
There are two approaches to the capital financing dilemmas that can
be pursued at the local level. The first approach, especially for com-
munities that appear to be "locked-out" of the general obligation bond
market becuse of tax restrictions, is to consider alternative-finance
mechanisms. Unfortunately, there are not many viable alternatives from
which severely impacted communities can choose. For all communities
there are a number of steps that can be taken to minimize the bond
rating impacts of Proposition 2-1/2. Some tips, which were offered by
a town that was able to avoid a rating suspension through assertive
interaction with Moody's, will be discussed below.
On May 13, 1981, the Massachusetts Collectors' and Treasurers'
Assodiation- devoted thetr meeting -to the problem of bond market access
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after Proposition 2-1/2. At this meeting, Bradford H. Warner, Vice
President of the First National Bank of Boston, gave his assessment of
the prognosis for cities and towns seeking long-term financing. He
focused in on the differential impact of Proposition 2-1/2, with the
following comments:
"Generally, what we've seen in the marketplace so far is
tremendous polarization in the market's attitudes towards com-
munities in Massachusetts. This has shown up primarily in the
secondary market since there haven't been too many new issues.
That polarization has taken this form: on the one hand, com-
munities which are generally regarded as poorer credits, or
weaker credits, are the ones that are going to be significantly
impacted by Proposition 2-1/2. (These communities) would have
a very difficult time raising long-term capital, and their
bonds in the secondary market-...bonds that may be sold and
changing hands among the investors- are doing so in a very,
very limited way. We've seen alot of investor resistance in
trading those types of security.
On the other hand, however, communities that are not
severely affect, that are considered strong credits- their
bonds are trading very well. There is a good active market for
them. In fact, we think that communities in very good, sound
credit condition could probably raise capital, although interest
rates are high as a whole right now. We think they'd get a
fairly good reception in the bond market today- much along the
lines of what Concord experienced."81
Prospects for the "weaker credits" in raising long-term capital are
indeed bleak. If such communities cannot tempt the market with general
obligation bonds, there may be other types of financing mechanisms
available that will be marketable. For any project or capital improve-
ment that can operate through user fees, revenue bonds are a viable
solution. Revenue bonds do not depend upon the fiscal strength of the
local government for debt security. The analyst need only appraise
8 1Warner, Bradford H., V.P., First National Bank of Boston, Quoted from
a transcript of the May 13, 1981 meeting of the Massachusetts Collectors'
and Treasurers' Association, (transcribed by author).
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the risks involved in operating the facility, and projecting demand for,
and receipts from the enterprise to determine the level of risk involved.
Revenue bonds backed by a credible projection of user-fee revenues will
gain the poorer communities access to the credit markets if the project
is appropriate.
Revenue bonds may provide a solution in a few cases, but they serve
limited applications. In my quest for flexible debt instruments that
are insulated from claims against general revenues, two finance mechanisms
have emerged, but each is beset by implementation problems. These poten-
tially useful mechanisms include tax increment financing, and special
tax districts.
Tax increment financing, (TIF), or tax allocation bonds, as it is
called in California, would require that Proposition 2-1/2 be amended to
allow new development to be added to the tax base, for it to work. A
TIF scheme is applicable to capital improvements projects for which there
will be a subsequent growth in property values encouraged by the improve-
ment.
The process begins by specifying the boundaries of the parcel of
land including and surrounding the improvement site- this is called the
development district. The assessed value of the property is then frozen
at the value before improvements begin, and that assessment level becomes
the base on which revenues collected will continue to be allocated to
the city's general fund. Any increase or increment in assessed value
above that base level generates tax revenues that are allocated to pay
off the debt service costs of the improvements financing. Often related
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non-tax revenues will also go toward the debt service fund.
One advantage of TIF is that it directly couples the capital improve-
ment with some form of private economic development. This financing sys-
tem has been criticized as a drain on general fund revenues similar to
property tax rebates offered by cities to entice development. If the
capital investment is of a traditionally public nature, such as streets,
sidewalks, sewerage, or water, then this criticism would seem unjustified.
The tax increment system is a way of earmarking property tax revenues
for debt service requiements, thus insulating the revenue flow from the
political pressures of the general fund. If TIF is used to finance
private-type improvements, however, such as a convention center to accom-
pany a hotel, then the revenue-loss criticism may be valid.
Tax increment financing requires state enabling legislation and
capacity for growth in assessed values to be reflected in: property tax
revenues. The finance mechanism also requires careful and elaborate
planning. -There does not seem to be a strong demand for such a system
in Massachusetts. Significant legislative initiative would be necessary
in order to implement the TIF system.
One final possibility for financing improvements in cities is the
special tax districts. A special tax district could take the form of
a water, sewer, or school district, but new approaches have included the
development of multi-purpose downtown districts to facilitate development
or improvements within a designated part of the city.82 These districts
82Brandt, James C., "The Role of the Special Tax District in Downtown
Development", Paper prepared for the American Planning Association,
1981, National Conference, April 27, 1981, Boston.
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are managed by a semi-public development authority, which is given a
broad mandate to improve and/or revitalize the district. The authority
is authorized to levy a limited tax on property within the district, this
authorization is reviewed periodically. The authority can issue bonds
to achieve improvements as well. Whether a sub-local special district
would be able to levy a tax on property outside of the limits imposed by
Proposition 2-1/2 is uncertain. Given the strict wording of Proposition
2-1/2, it is unlikely that such a district could levy a tax that would
result in the total levy increasing beyond 2-1/2.
In conclusion, there does not seem to be-a finance mechanism that
will resolve the problems faced by municipalities that cannot market
general obligation bonds because of Proposition 2-1/2 induced fiscal
strain.
Although the bond market impacts of Proposition 2-1/2 will be quite
restrictive for some communities, there are steps that can be taken to
make the best of a bad situation. Five local initiatives were cited in
the introduction including State House lobbying, capital improvements
planning and expenditure reduction planning, competant and creative
fiscal management, public relations to emphasize local strengths over
weaknesses, and disclosures of fiscal information to the investor
community-.
The proponents of Proposition 2-1/2 showed great skill in political
maneuvering. Massachusetts is a state with a long tradition of political
activism, and those interests who do not exercise their political muscles
soon lose them. One crucial factor in the success of the tax limita-
tion movement in 1980 was the creation of a strong coalition of interest
groups- including Citizen's for Limited Taxation (CLT), The High-Tech-
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nology Council, and Associated Industries of Massachusetts, to name
the dominant members.
The story behind the coalition headed by CLT in the push for Pro-
position 2-1/2 is a good case study of the rise of a political force
Massachusetts style. 83 The opponents of Proposition 2-1/2 had neither
the political cohesion nor the economic resources that characterized
the CLT coalition. If there is any consensus between local government
interests as to what action should be taken by the legislative vis-a-
vis Proposition 2-1/2, then that message must be relayed to the legis-
lature in a politically impressive manner. Groups such as the Massachu-
setts Collectors' and Treasurers' Association, among others have each
lobbied extensively at the State House to express the local government
interest. What is necessary, however, is to build a coalition of
interests comparable in strength and numbers to the CLT coalition, to
impress upon the legislature that the political stakes are still high
on both sides. Diverse interests such as Mass Fair Share, and banking
interests representing investors can be recruited to broaden the base
of the municipal constituency.
Short of re-igniting the political bonfire, however, are steps that
can be taken individually by municipalities to cut their losses. Improve-
ment of management, planning, and information flows can improve local
efficiency and will favorably impress the rating analysts. The capital
improvements programs of many cities will have to be re-evaluated in
light of the difficulties in raising capital, and the increased interest
costs. Priorities for improvements can be made more explicit, including
83Tvedt, Sherry.
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how an expenditure meshes with a view of the community's future. Planning
for budget cuts is also very important. To avoid interagency conflict
it is adviseable to initiate dialogue between the local executive and
service delivery arms of the government. Steps can be taken to improve
revenue collection and eliminate delinquencies in tax payments and fee
collection. New sources of revenue can usually be found, such as con-
verting from tax supported services to user-fee supported services.
The important point from the above list of suggestions is that the
community that acts most quickly in response to the cuts will rebound
the quickest, both in terms of stabilizing service deliveries at ade-
quate levels and in regaining access to the credit market to continue
with capital improvements. It was interesting to note at the Massachu-
setts Collectors' and Treasurers' Meeting how different Brookline's
response was from Amherst's response to Moody's request for information
about the impacts of Proposition 2-1/2.
Janes Lindstromi of Amherst described his strategy in responding to
Moody's as a process of second guessing what the rating agency would
want to know, and delivering more information than was explicitly
requesteJ.84  Of course, Amherst was somewhat fortunate in that Lindstrom
was able to demonstrate that a property tax cut would be avoided, because
the town was undergoing a revaluation that reduced their effective tax
rate to within the limit.
840p. Cit., Massachusetts Collectors' and Treasurers' Association, James
Lindstrom.
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Beyond the data requested by Moody's, Amherst communicated four
main points to the rating agency. 1) because of the revaluation, the
property tax levy could grow slightly rather than be cut; 2) the amount
of fees for services could be increased in a number of areas; 3) a meeting
between the selectmen and the School Department was held to negotiate
how the limited revenues would be allocated; and 4) the vote in Amherst
was against 2-1/2, so that when the override vote is eventually held,
there is a strong likelihood that Amherst would vote to override the
provision.
Even communities that are more adversely affected by Proposition
2-1/2 than well-off Amherst can demonstrate managerial control over the
situation. It is crucial to inform Moody's that a thorough review of
all the choices has been undertaken, and where cuts are necessary a cut-
back process will ensure that the situation will remain under control.
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate impacts of Proposition 2-1/2 for the municipal bond
market will depend upon what action is taken by the state legislature.
The secondary market for existing- debt appears to have responded by
avoiding the bonds that were issued by the most hard-hit municipalities.
The cities and towns with high tax rates and a heavy debt burden are in
a very vulnerable position. Many communities, such as Concord and
Amherst, however, will come through virtually unscathed.
Even the hard hit cities may regain their standing in the credit
markets once the revenue reductions have run their course, but some
communities will face reductions for several years. Meanwhile, the
infrastructure of these places will deteriorate as maintenance and
replacement programs are deferred for lack of funds.
Increases in state aid will help the current account and permit
more upkeep expenditures. Long-term capital, however, will remain
inaccessible to some communities so long as there is no way to insulate
that portion of revenues that goes to debt service from competing
interests. Even distressed cities will be able to raise some capital
through negotiated private placements with local businesses and financial
institutions.
It is important for the future of cities to maintain an ongoing
capital improvements program. Capital improvements can be deferred in
the short-run, but will have to be made up for in the long-run. Declining
cities will hasten the departure of residents if improvements are
neglected. Growing cities face unsafe or unsanitary conditions if
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facilities are not in place when needed.
There appears to be a real threat that the lack of long-term capi-
tal will gradually result in what John Petersen calls a "wasting disease"
from lack of maintenance and replacement of capital facilities. 85  It
is because these problems occur gradually that the effects can grow to
serious levels before the public will respond with corrective action.
I have tried to assess this danger prospectively, before unnecessary
hardships are incurred.
85Petersen, John E., "Proposition 13 and the Bond Market".
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